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I.   INTRODUCTION 
 
[1] Our information inhabits a perilous world.  Cyber theft, cyber 
extortion, mobile device loss, misappropriation of confidential business 
information, and unauthorized disclosures of protected information are 
real and present dangers for organizations of all sizes and across all 
industries.
1
  
                                                             
*
 Peter Sloan is a partner at the law firm Husch Blackwell LLP and a founding member of 
the firm’s Information Governance Group.  For over a decade he had focused his law 
practice on how organizations can best retain, protect, preserve, and compliantly dispose 
of their records and information.  He is an ARMA International member and a participant 
in Working Groups 1 and 11 of The Sedona Conference.  He presents and writes 
frequently on information governance topics, including The Compliance Case for 
Information Governance, 20 RICH. J.L. & TECH. 4 (2014).  The author thanks the JOLT 
staff for their patience and diligence; Cordero Delgadillo and Suzie Specker for their 
indefatigable research of FTC enforcement matters; and Kerri Steffens for her invaluable 
work in confirming the citations in this article.  The views expressed, and any errors 
made, are solely those of the author, and such views are not attributable to his law firm or 
its clients. 
 
1
 The Verizon 2014 Data Breach Investigations Report analyzed 1,367 security incidents 
that occurred during 2013 with confirmed data losses.  See 2014 Data Breach 
Investigations Report, VERIZON 2 (2014), available at 
http://www.verizonenterprise.com/DBIR/2014/, archived at http://perma.cc/W9QD-
SR28.  Industries suffering such security incidents included: Finance, Public, Retail, 
Accommodation, Utilities, Professional, Manufacturing, Information, Education, Mining, 
Transportation, Administrative, Healthcare, Entertainment, Real Estate, Trade, 
Construction, and Management.  Id. at 6.  According to Verizon, the nine incident 
patterns that account for virtually all of these security incidents are: Web App Attacks 
(35%), Cyber-espionage (22%), Point-of-Sale Intrusions (14%), Card Skimmers (9%), 
Insider Misuse (8%), Crimeware (4%), Miscellaneous Errors (2%), Physical Theft/Loss 
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[2] Organizations must also navigate a bewildering landscape of data 
security fiefdoms within United States’ federal and state law, under which 
specific types of entities must safeguard specific kinds of protected 
information.
2
  Moreover, the Federal Trade Commission (“FTC”) has 
enforced data security in numerous matters without underlying regulatory 
standards, employing the legal theory that inadequate information security 
is an unfair business practice.
3
 
 
[3] The reality is that security breaches may be inevitable no matter 
how diligently an organization safeguards its information.  As then FBI 
Director, Robert Mueller, observed in 2012, “[t]here are only two types of 
companies: those that have been hacked, and those that will be.  Even that 
is merging into one category: those that have been hacked and will be 
again.”4  Perhaps in recognition that security perfection is unattainable, 
information security laws share a common theme of reasonableness.  The 
notion of reasonableness permeates explicit statutory and regulatory 
requirements for safeguarding information, and appears to be a central 
tenet of FTC enforcement orders regarding information security.  Yet such 
legal requirements and orders frequently fail to specify what 
reasonableness means in their particular domains.  And so, one is left to 
wonder, what constitutes a “reasonable” information security program?   
  
[4] Section II of this article explores the pertinence of reasonableness 
in different expressions of United States’ information security law, from 
the protection of trade secrets to prescriptive data security requirements 
                                                                                                                                                       
(< 1%), and Denial of Service Attacks (0%, due to cohort requirement of confirmed data 
loss).  Id. at 14. 
 
2
 See infra Part II.B. 
 
3
 See infra Part II.D. 
 
4
 Stacy Cowley, FBI Director: Cybercrime will eclipse terrorism, CNN (Mar. 2, 2012, 
7:55 AM), http://money.cnn.com/2012/03/02/technology/fbi_cybersecurity/, archived at 
http://perma.cc/7J3L-Q8XX.  
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under HIPAA, Gramm-Leach-Bliley, FACTA, COPPA, and the wide 
range of state laws mandating safeguards for protected information, as 
well as the U.S.-EU Safe Harbor Privacy Principles, and ultimately FTC 
enforcement proceedings under Section 5 of the FTC Act.   
 
[5] Section III proposes six essential elements of a reasonable 
information security program, derived from United States’ federal and 
state legal requirements, as well as voluntary standards—including ISO 
27002
5
 and the Framework for Improving Critical Infrastructure 
Cybersecurity recently published by the National Institute of Standards 
and Technology (“NIST”).6   As discussed more fully in Section III, a 
                                                             
5
 ISO 27002 is an international, voluntary standard, the code of practice for information 
security controls.  INT'L ORG. FOR STANDARDIZATION, ISO 27002, SECURITY 
TECHNIQUES-CODE OF PRACTICE FOR INFORMATION SECURITY CONTROLS § 27002 (2013) 
[hereinafter ISO 27002].  It originated in a document published by the U.K. government, 
became a standard (BS7799) in 1995, was adopted as the International Standard ISO 
17799 in 2000, and was renumbered in 2005 as ISO 27002.  INT'L ORG. FOR 
STANDARDIZATION, ISO 27001, AN INTRODUCTION TO ISO 27001 (2005) [hereinafter 
ISO 27001].  The most recent 2013 version of ISO 27002 contains 114 security controls 
organized in fourteen sections.  See ISO 27002.  Though it contains voluntary guidance 
for organizations on information security controls, ISO 27002 also supports ISO 27001, 
which is an international standard for information security management systems, against 
which certification is granted.  See ISO 27001.  Currently over a thousand certificates of 
compliance with ISO 27001 are in place globally.  See id. 
 
6
 The National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) published its Framework 
for Improving Critical Infrastructure Cybersecurity on February 12, 2014.  See NIST 
Releases Cybersecurity Framework Version 1.0, NAT’L INST. OF STANDARDS & TECH. 
(Feb. 12, 2014), http://www.NIST.gov/itl/csd/launch-cybersecurity-framework-
021214.cfm, archived at http://perma.cc/7U3T-ZYU3.  NIST developed the 
Cybersecurity Framework in response to Executive Order 13636: Improving Critical 
Infrastructure Cybersecurity, issued by President Obama in February 2013, which called 
for development of a voluntary, risk-based cybersecurity framework to help organizations 
manage cyber risks.  Id.  The NIST Cybersecurity Framework includes a Framework 
Core, which is an organization of specific cybersecurity activities and outcomes, with 
references to pertinent standards.  Id.  The Cybersecurity Framework also includes 
Framework Implementation Tiers and a Framework Profile, which together allow 
organizations to determine how best to assess and identify risks and apply controls 
consistent with the organization’s objectives regarding cybersecurity.  Id.  The 
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reasonable information security program should include the following 
elements, with each element addressed in a manner consistent with the 
organization’s applicable legal requirements, obligations to third-parties, 
and strategic approach to risk: 
 
1. An organization should identify the types of information in its 
possession, custody, or control for which it will establish security 
safeguards (“Protected Information”). 
2. An organization should assess anticipated threats, vulnerabilities, and 
risks to the security of Protected Information. 
3. An organization should establish and maintain appropriate policies and 
administrative, physical, and technical controls to address the 
identified threats, vulnerabilities, and risks to the security of Protected 
Information.   
4. An organization should address the security of Protected Information 
in its third-party relationships.   
5. An organization should respond to detected breaches of the security of 
Protected Information. 
                                                                                                                                                       
Framework Core organizes categories and subcategories of specific cybersecurity 
controls and activities in terms of five cybersecurity functions: identify, protect, detect, 
respond, and recover.  Id.     
 
The context of the Cybersecurity Framework is information security for “critical 
infrastructure,” which has a broad footprint.  Id.  The Presidential Policy Directive on 
Critical Infrastructure Security and Resilience identifies sixteen critical infrastructure 
sectors in the United States, including Chemical; Commercial Facilities; 
Communications; Critical Manufacturing; Dams; Defense Industrial Base; Emergency 
Services; Energy; Financial Services; Food and Agriculture; Government Facilities; 
Healthcare and Public Health; Information Technology; Nuclear Reactors, Materials, and 
Waste; Transportation Systems; and Water and Wastewater Systems.  Press Release, The 
White House Office of the Press Secretary, Presidential Policy Directive—Critical 
Infrastructure Security and Resilience (Feb. 12, 2013), available at 
http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2013/02/12/presidential-policy-directive-
critical-infrastructure-security-and-resil, archived at http://perma.cc/4NHZ-36E9. 
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6. An organization should periodically review and update its policies and 
controls for the security of Protected Information.  
 
Although the absence of a reasonable information security program does 
not inexorably result in liability for the organization,
7
 greater clarity 
                                                             
7
 For example, companies suffering data breaches have successfully defeated customer 
class action claims by relying on the Supreme Court’s decision in Clapper v. Amnesty 
International, in which the court found plaintiffs lacked standing for failure to show 
actual harm or certainly impending injury.  Clapper v. Amnesty Int’l, 133 S. Ct. 1138, 
1148–51 (2013) (plaintiffs “cannot manufacture standing merely by inflicting harm on 
themselves based on their fears of hypothetical future harm that is not certainly 
impending.”).  See, e.g., In re Barnes & Noble Pin Pad Litig., 12-cv-8617, 2013 U.S. 
Dist. LEXIS 125730, at *11–12 (N.D. Ill. Sept. 3, 2013) (dismissing plaintiffs’ claims for 
lack of standing, holding that an increased risk of fraud or identity theft did not satisfy 
actual injury requirement); Galaria v. Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co., 998 F. Supp. 2d 646, 657 
(S.D. Ohio 2014) (holding allegations of possible future injury due to data breach, 
standing alone, are too speculative to confer standing, and expenses incurred to monitor 
and prevent identity theft held not to be actual injuries); Polanco v. Omnicell, Inc., 988 F. 
Supp. 2d 451, 467–68 (D.N.J. 2013); In re Sci. Applications Int’l Corp. (SAIC) Backup 
Tape Data Theft Litg., No. 12-347 (JEB), 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 64125, at *33 (D.D.C. 
May 9, 2014); Strautins v. Trustwave Holdings, Inc., No. 12 C 09115, 2014 U.S. Dist. 
LEXIS 32118, at *21–25 (N.D. Ill. Mar. 12, 2014).  But see In re Sony Gaming Networks 
& Customer Data Sec. Breach Litig., 996 F. Supp. 2d 942, 962 (S.D. Cal. 2014) (denying 
motion to dismiss, holding allegations of actual data breach and of theft and disclosure of 
plaintiffs’ personal information are sufficient to establish certainly impending injury). 
 
In the context of shareholder claims arising from data breaches, the business judgment 
rule shields corporate directors and officers from civil liability for decisions allegedly 
breaching the fiduciary duty of care, absent gross negligence.  See Stone v. Ritter, 911 
A.2d 362, 372 (Del. 2006).  Shareholder claims based instead upon directors’ and 
officers’ alleged failure to exercise effective oversight are subject to the legal standards 
of In re Caremark International Derivative Litigation and its progeny.  Such Caremark 
claims of oversight liability require the failure of directors and officers to act in good 
faith, resulting in a breach of the duty of loyalty.  Stone, 911 A.2d at 369–70.  For such 
liability to exist, the directors or officers must either fail “to implement any reporting or 
information system or controls; or [] having implemented such a system or controls, [they 
must] consciously fail[] to monitor or oversee . . . [their] operations,” thereby preventing 
themselves from being informed of risks or problems that require their attention.  Id. at 
370.  See Palkon v. Holmes, No.14-CV-01234, 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 148799 (D.N.J. 
Oct. 20, 2014) (dismissing derivative action claims arising from Wyndham Worldwide 
Corporation’s data security breaches).  
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regarding what constitutes a reasonable information security program 
would advance certainty for all concerned, and particularly for 
organizations operating, as they must, in a perilous information world.   
 
II.   THE RELEVANCE OF REASONABLENESS 
  
[6] The concept of reasonableness pervades the law of information 
security.  As discussed below, reasonableness is a common, unifying 
theme, from trade secret law protecting the organization’s confidential 
business information to the various prescriptive legal schemes requiring 
safeguards for different types of protected information, as well as under 
the U.S.-EU Safe Harbor Privacy Principles and in FTC enforcement of 
information security.   
 
A.   Reasonableness and the Protection of Confidential 
Business Information 
 
[7] Organizations rely on trade secret law for protection of 
confidential intellectual property.  Trade secret status may exist for “all 
forms and types of financial, business, scientific, technical, economic, or 
engineering information,” if such information has actual or potential 
economic value by being neither generally known to, nor readily 
accessible through proper means by, the public.
8
  Trade secret status, 
however, only exists if “reasonable measures” are taken to maintain the 
information’s secrecy.9   
 
 
                                                             
8
 18 U.S.C. § 1839(3)(B) (2012); see also UNIF. TRADE SECRETS ACT § 1(4), 14 U.L.A. 
538 (2005). 
 
9
 18 U.S.C. § 1839(3)(A) (2012) (“The owner therefore has taken reasonable measures to 
keep such information secret”); UNIF. TRADE SECRETS ACT § 1(4)(ii), 14 U.L.A. 538 
(2005) (“is the subject of efforts that are reasonable under the circumstances to maintain 
its secrecy”). 
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B.   Reasonableness Under Laws Requiring Information 
Safeguards  
 
1.   Federal Information Security Laws 
 
[8] The Security Rule under the Health Insurance Portability and 
Accountability Act (“HIPAA”) is prescriptive in that HIPAA covered 
entities and business associates must comply with applicable standards 
and implementation specifications.
10
  Nevertheless, the Security Rule’s 
standards are grounded in reasonableness, both in the identification of risk 
and the application of security controls.  Thus, fundamental requirements 
under the Security Rule include protection “against any reasonably 
anticipated threats or hazards to the security or integrity” of electronic 
protected health information, and “against any reasonably anticipated uses 
or disclosures of such information that are not permitted or required” 
under the HIPAA privacy rules.
11
  For implementation of policies and 
controls, HIPAA requires covered entities and business associates to 
establish security measures “sufficient to reduce risks and vulnerabilities 
to a reasonable and appropriate level . . . .” 12   Covered entities and 
business associates may therefore “use any security measures that allow 
the covered entity or business associate to reasonably and appropriately 
implement the standards and implementation specifications as specified” 
in the Security Rule.
13
  The security standards in the HIPAA Security Rule 
are accompanied by thirty-six implementation specifications, twenty-two 
of which are classified as “Addressable.” 14   If an implementation 
specification is “Addressable,” the covered entity or business associate 
                                                             
10
 See 45 C.F.R. § 164.302 (2013). 
 
11
 45 C.F.R. § 164.306(a)(2)–(3) (2013). 
 
12
 45 C.F.R. § 164.308(a)(1)(ii)(B) (2013). 
 
13
 45 C.F.R. § 164.306(b)(1) (2013). 
 
14
 45 C.F.R. pt. 164, subpt. C, app. A (2013). 
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must assess whether the implementation specification “is a reasonable and 
appropriate safeguard in its environment, when analyzed with reference to 
the likely contribution to protecting” ePHI.15   
 
[9] The Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act requires regulators of financial 
institutions to establish standards for “administrative, technical, and 
physical safeguards” for “the security and confidentiality of customer 
records and information.” 16   The resulting “Interagency Guidelines 
Establishing Information Security Standards,” cooperatively promulgated 
by the respective federal banking agencies,
17
 require such financial 
                                                             
15
 45 C.F.R. § 164.306(d)(3)(i) (2013).  If the implementation specification is “reasonable 
and appropriate,” it must be implemented, and if such implementation would not be 
“reasonable and appropriate,” the covered entity or business associate must document 
why it would not be so and must “[i]mplement an equivalent alternative measure if 
reasonable and appropriate.”  45 C.F.R. § 164.306(d)(3)(ii) (2013). 
 
16
 15 U.S.C. §§ 6801(b), (b)(1) (2012). 
 
17
 See, e.g., 12 C.F.R. pt. 30, app. B (2014) (Office of Comptroller of the Currency 
(“OCC”) standards applicable to “national banks, federal branches and federal agencies 
of foreign banks,” and subsidiaries other than “brokers, dealers, persons providing 
insurance, investment companies, and investment advisers”); 12 C.F.R. pt. 170, app. B 
(2014) (OCC standards applicable to federal savings associations); 12 C.F.R. pt. 208, 
app. D-2 (2014) (Federal Reserve Board standards applicable to state member banks and 
their non-bank subsidiaries, “except for brokers, dealers, persons providing insurance, 
investment companies, and investment advisers”); 12 C.F.R. pt. 225, app. F (2014) 
(Federal Reserve Board standards applicable to bank holding companies and their non-
bank subsidiaries or affiliates (except brokers, dealers, insurance providers, investment 
companies, and investment advisers) for which the Federal Reserve Board has 
supervisory authority); 12 C.F.R. pt. 364, app. B (2014) (Federal Deposit Insurance 
Corporation (FDIC) standards applicable to insured non-member banks, “insured state 
branches of foreign banks, and any subsidiaries of such entities (except brokers, dealers, 
persons providing insurance, investment companies, and investment advisers)”).   
 
The Board of the National Credit Union Administration has similar standards for 
safeguarding member information under Gramm-Leach-Bliley.  See 12 C.F.R. pt. 748, 
app. A (2014).  The Bureau of Consumer Financial Protection is explicitly not authorized 
to establish data security standards for financial institutions within its jurisdiction; see 
also 15 U.S.C. § 6801(b) (2012). 
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institutions to implement a comprehensive written information security 
program, with administrative, technical, and physical safeguards 
“appropriate to the size and complexity of the [entity] and the nature and 
scope of its activities.” 18   When developing an information security 
program, the financial institution must first assess risk by identifying 
“reasonably foreseeable internal and external threats that could result in 
unauthorized disclosure, misuse, alteration, or destruction of customer 
information or customer information systems.”19   
 
[10] The Securities and Exchange Commission addresses safeguard 
standards under Gramm-Leach-Bliley for customer information retained 
by registered brokers, dealers, investment companies, and investment 
advisers in Regulation S-P, requiring the adoption of written policies and 
procedures to address administrative, technical, and physical safeguards 
for protecting customer records and information.  Regulation S-P provides 
that such written policies and procedures must be “reasonably designed 
to”: 
 
(1) Insure the security and confidentiality of customer 
records and information;  
 
(2) Protect against any anticipated threats or hazards to the 
security or integrity of customer records and information; 
and  
 
(3) Protect against unauthorized access to or use of 
customer records or information that could result in 
substantial harm or inconvenience to any customer.
20
   
 
                                                             
18
 12 C.F.R. pt. 30, app. B(II)(A) (2014). 
 
19
 12 C.F.R. pt. 30, app. B(III)(B)(1) (2014). 
 
20
 17 C.F.R. § 248.30(a)(1)–(3) (2014). 
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The FTC standards for safeguarding customer information, applicable to 
financial institutions not subject to the jurisdiction of the above agencies 
or authorities,
21
 contain “standards for developing, implementing, and 
maintaining reasonable administrative, technical, and physical safeguards 
to protect the security, confidentiality, and integrity of customer 
information.” 22   Under the FTC Safeguards Rule, the mandated 
comprehensive information security program must be developed by 
identifying “reasonably foreseeable internal and external risks to the 
security, confidentiality, and integrity of customer information . . . .”23  
The resulting information security program must also be “reasonably 
designed” to achieve the standard’s objectives.24   
 
[11] The Fair and Accurate Credit Transactions Act (“FACTA”) 
requires the regulators of financial institutions to promulgate rules 
requiring the proper disposal of customer information derived from 
consumer reports for a business purpose.
25
  Disposal Rules promulgated 
                                                             
21
 See 15 U.S.C. § 6805(a)(8) (2012).  Safeguards standards under Gramm-Leach-Bliley 
for insurance providers are a matter of state insurance law, addressed by the applicable 
state insurance authorities.  See 15 U.S.C. §§ 6801(b), 6805(a)(6) (2012). 
 
22
 16 C.F.R. § 314.1(a) (2014). 
 
23
 16 C.F.R. § 314.4(b) (2014). 
 
24
 See 16 C.F.R. § 314.3(a) (2014). 
 
25
 See, e.g., 15 U.S.C. § 1681w(a)(1) (2012).  Under FACTA, various federal agencies 
must also promulgate regulations requiring each financial institution and each creditor to 
“establish reasonable policies and procedures” to identify possible risks, or “red flags,” of 
identity theft, potentially harmful to account holders, customers, or the institution.  15 
U.S.C. § 1681m(e)(1)(B) (2012).  The resulting Red Flags Rules of financial institution 
regulators require such institutions to establish an identity theft prevention program, 
which must include “reasonable policies and procedures” to identify relevant Red Flags 
for the covered accounts and incorporate them into the identity theft prevention program.  
See, e.g., 16 C.F.R. § 681.1(a), 681.1(d)(1)–(2) (2014) (Federal Trade Commission’s Red 
Flags Rule for financial institutions and creditors subject to administrative enforcement 
by the FTC).  The same “reasonable policies and procedures” language is found in the 
Red Flags Rules of the OCC, 12 C.F.R. § 41.90(a), 41.90(d)(1)–(2) (2014) (national 
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under FACTA require persons who maintain or possess consumer 
information comprising or derived from a consumer report for a business 
purpose to properly dispose of such information “by taking reasonable 
measures to protect against unauthorized access to or use of the 
information in connection with its disposal.”26   
 
[12] The Children’s Online Privacy Protection Act (“COPPA”) requires 
the FTC to promulgate regulations requiring operators of websites or 
online services directed to children to establish and maintain “reasonable 
procedures to protect the confidentiality, security, and integrity of personal 
information collected from children.”27  Accordingly, the FTC’s COPPA 
Rule succinctly provides that such operators “must establish and maintain 
                                                                                                                                                       
banks, federal savings associations, federal branches or agencies of foreign banks, or 
their operating subsidiaries); the Federal Reserve Board, 12 C.F.R. § 222.90(a), 
222.90(d)(1)–(2) (2014) (Federal Reserve System member banks other than national 
banks and their operating subsidiaries, branches and agencies of foreign banks, and 
commercial lending companies owned or controlled by foreign banks); the FDIC, 12 
C.F.R. § 334.90(a), 334.90(d)(1)–(2) (2014) (insured state non-member banks, insured 
state licensed branches of foreign banks, and their subsidiaries (except for brokers, 
dealers, insurance providers, investment companies, and investment advisers)); the 
National Credit Union Administration, 12 C.F.R. §§ 717.90(a), 717.90(d)(1)–(2) (2014) 
(federal credit unions); and the SEC, 17 C.F.R. §§ 248.201(a)(1)–(3), 248.201(d)(1)–(2) 
(2014) (registered brokers, dealers, investment companies, and investment advisers). 
 
26
 16 C.F.R. § 682.3(a) (2014).  The Disposal Rules of other financial institution 
regulators contain the same “reasonable measures” language.  See 17 C.F.R. § 
248.30(b)(2) (2014) (SEC Disposal Rule for registered brokers, dealers, investment 
companies, and investment advisers).  Other financial institution regulators have included 
their Disposal Rules in their Guidelines Establishing Information Security Standards 
including the OCC.  See, e.g., 12 C.F.R. § 41.83(b) (2014), 12 C.F.R pt. 30, app. 
B(III)(C)(4) (2014) (Comptroller of the Currency); 12 C.F.R. § 222.83(b) (2014), 12 
C.F.R. pt. 208, app. D-2(III)(C)(4) (2014) (Federal Reserve System); 12 C.F.R. § 
334.83(a) (2014), 12 C.F.R. pt. 364, app. B(III)(C)(4) (2014) (Federal Deposit Insurance 
Corporation); 12 C.F.R. § 717.83(a) (2014), 12 C.F.R. pt. 748, app. A(III)(C)(4) (2014) 
(National Credit Union Administration).   
 
27
 15 U.S.C. § 6502(b)(1)(D) (2012). 
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reasonable procedures to protect the confidentiality, security, and integrity 
of personal information collected from children.”28 
 
2.   State Information Security Laws 
 
[13] Various states affirmatively require persons and businesses 
possessing protected personally identifiable information (“PII”) of state 
residents to implement and maintain “reasonable security procedures and 
practices appropriate to the nature of the information to protect the 
personal information from unauthorized access, destruction, use, 
modification, or disclosure.” 29   Persons who own or license personal 
information about Massachusetts’ residents must maintain a written 
comprehensive information security program with administrative, 
technical, and physical safeguards that are  
 
Appropriate to (a) the size, scope and type of business of 
the person obligated to safeguard the personal information 
under such comprehensive information security program; 
(b) the amount of resources available to such person; (c) the 
amount of stored data; and (d) the need for security and 
                                                             
28
 16 C.F.R. § 312.8 (2014). 
 
29
 See, e.g., ARK. CODE ANN. § 4-110-104(b) (Supp. 2011); see also CAL. CIV. CODE § 
1798.81.5(b) (Deering Supp. 2014) (“implement and maintain reasonable security 
procedures and practices”); MD. CODE ANN., COM. LAW § 14-3503(a) (LexisNexis Supp. 
2013) (“implement and maintain reasonable security procedures and practices”); NEV. 
REV. STAT. § 603A.210(1) (LexisNexis Supp. 2010) (“implement and maintain 
reasonable security measures”); OR. REV. STAT. § 646A.622(1) (West 2011) (“develop, 
implement and maintain reasonable safeguards”); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 11-49.2-2(2) (Supp. 
2013) (“implement and maintain reasonable security procedures and practices”); UTAH 
CODE ANN. § 13-44-201(1) (LexisNexis 2013) (“implement and maintain reasonable 
procedures”).  Effective July 1, 2014, the Florida Information Protection Act of 2014 
requires commercial entities that acquire, maintain, store, or use PII—and also entities 
contracted to maintain, store, or process PII on their behalf—to “take reasonable 
measures to protect and secure” electronic PII.  FLA. STAT. ANN. § 501.171(2) (2014). 
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confidentiality of both consumer and employee 
information.
30
 
 
[14] A majority of states have laws requiring entities with PII of state 
residents to take reasonable measures to protect such information when it 
is disposed of or discarded.  Alaska, Colorado, Hawaii, North Carolina, 
and Oregon require such entities to have a disposal policy for PII.
31
  Other 
states specify compliant means of reasonable PII disposal, such as 
shredding of hardcopy documents, effective erasure of electronic media, 
or other similar actions that render PII unreadable or indecipherable.
32
  
                                                             
30
 201 MASS. CODE REGS. 17.03(1)(a)–(d) (2013).  Though some of the Massachusetts 
standards’ requirements are unambiguously prescriptive, the standards incorporate 
reasonableness, such as in program development through identifying and assessing 
“reasonably foreseeable internal and external risks to the security, confidentiality, and/or 
integrity of any electronic, paper or other records containing personal information, . . . 
[taking] reasonable steps to select and retain third-party service providers, . . . 
[establishing] [r]easonable restrictions upon physical access . . . ”; performing regular 
monitoring to ensure that the program is “operating in a manner reasonably calculated to 
prevent unauthorized access to or unauthorized use of personal information . . . ”; and 
“[r]eviewing the scope of security measures . . . whenever there is a material change in 
business practices that may reasonably implicate the security or integrity of records 
containing personal information.”  201 MASS. CODE REGS. 17.03(2)(b), (2)(f)(1), (2)(g)–
(i) (2013).  The Massachusetts requirements for computer system security similarly 
employ reasonableness in requirements regarding assignment and selection of passwords, 
system monitoring, firewall protection, and system security agent software.  See 201 
MASS. CODE REGS. 17.04(1)(b), (4), (6)–(7) (2014). 
 
31
 See ALASKA STAT. § 45.48.530 (2012); COLO. REV. STAT. § 6-1-713(1) (2013); HAW. 
REV. STAT. ANN. § 487R-2(a), (b)(1)–(3) (LexisNexis Supp. 2012); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 
75-64(a)-(b)(1)–(3) (2013); OR. REV. STAT. ANN. § 646A.622(2)(a)–(c) (West 2011). 
 
32
 See, e.g., ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 44-7601(A)–(C) (2013); ARK. CODE ANN. § 4-110-
104(a) (Supp. 2011); CAL. CIV. CODE § 1798.81 (Deering Supp. 2014); CONN. GEN. 
STAT. § 42-471(a) (2013); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 501.171(8) (2014); GA. CODE ANN. § 10-
15-2 (2009); IND. CODE ANN. § 24-4-14-8 (2013); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 50-7a03 (Supp. 
2013); KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 365.725 (LexisNexis 2008); MD. CODE ANN., COM. LAW 
§ 14-3502(b) (LexisNexis Supp. 2013); MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 93H, § 2(a)–(b) (2012); 
MONT. CODE ANN. § 30-14-1703 (2013); NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. § 603A.200(1)–(2) 
(LexisNexis Supp. 2010); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 56:8-162 (West 2012); N.Y. GEN. BUS. LAW 
§ 399-h(2) (Consol. 2014); S.C. CODE ANN. § 37-20-190(A)–(B) (Supp. 2013); TEX. 
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[15] California, Maryland, Nevada, and Rhode Island require 
businesses that disclose state residents’ PII to non-affiliated third-parties 
to have contracts obligating such third-parties to establish reasonable PII 
security procedures and practices.
33
  Massachusetts and Oregon mandate 
information security programs that, among other matters, require 
appropriate PII protection to be addressed in service provider contracts.
34
  
And Alaska, Hawaii, and North Carolina have similar requirements for 
reasonable security measures in arrangements with service providers for 
PII disposal.
35
   
 
3.   Reasonableness under the U.S.-EU Safe Harbor  
Framework 
 
[16] The U.S.-EU Safe Harbor Framework, developed by the U.S. 
Department of Commerce, is the vehicle through which United States’ 
organizations can participate in the transfer of personal data protected by 
the European Commission’s Directive on Data Protection. 36  
                                                                                                                                                       
BUS. & COM. CODE ANN. § 521.052(b) (West Supp. 2013); UTAH CODE ANN. § 13-44-
201(1)–(2) (Supp. 2013); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 9, § 2445(b) (2006); WASH. REV. CODE  § 
19.215.020(1) (2014); WIS. STAT. § 134.97(2) (2012) (financial institutions, medical 
businesses, or tax preparation businesses). 
 
33
 See CAL. CIV. CODE § 1798.81.5(c) (Deering Supp. 2014); MD. CODE ANN., COM. LAW 
§ 14-3503(b)(1)(i)–(ii) (LexisNexis Supp. 2013); NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. § 603A.210(2) 
(LexisNexis Supp. 2010); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 11-49.2-2(3) (Supp. 2013). 
 
34
 See 201 MASS. CODE REGS. 17.03(2)(f)(2) (2012); OR. REV. STAT. ANN. § 
646A.622(2)(d)(A)(v) (West 2011). 
 
35
 See, e.g., ALASKA STAT. § 45.48.510(3) (2012); HAW. REV. STAT. ANN. § 487R-2(c) 
(LexisNexis Supp. 2012); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 75-64(c) (2013).  But see 815 ILL. COMP. 
STAT. § 530/40(c) (2012) (no reasonableness standard for provisions of disposal provider 
contracts); S.C. CODE ANN. § 37-20-190(B) (Supp. 2013) (no reasonableness standard for 
provisions of disposal provider contracts). 
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Organizations in the United States may voluntarily apply for Safe Harbor 
status by publicly declaring that they are and will be in compliance with 
the U.S.-EU Safe Harbor Framework’s requirements, and stating in their 
published privacy policies that they will adhere to the seven Safe Harbor 
Privacy Principles.
37
  Safe Harbor enforcement is primarily administered 
by the private sector, but certain regulators, including the FTC can enforce 
compliance through prohibitions against unfair and deceptive trade 
practices.
38
  Under the Safe Harbor’s Security Principle, “[o]rganizations 
must take reasonable precautions to protect personal information from 
loss, misuse and unauthorized access, disclosure, alteration and 
destruction.”39 
 
4.   Reasonableness under Section 5 of the FTC Act  
 
[17] The FTC has enforcement authority under several of the above-
referenced laws requiring security programs, including Gramm-Leach-
Bliley,
40
 FACTA,
41
 and COPPA.
42
  Because FTC regulations issuing from 
these statutes are couched in terms of reasonableness, FTC enforcement 
consent orders, unsurprisingly, incorporate a reasonableness standard as 
well.  FTC orders in enforcement matters under the Gramm-Leach-Bliley 
Security Rule commonly compel the respondent company to establish “a 
comprehensive information security program that is reasonably designed 
                                                                                                                                                       
36
 See U.S.-EU Safe Harbor Overview, EXPORT.GOV, 
http://www.export.gov/safeharbor/eu/eg_main_018476.asp (last visited Nov. 3, 2014), 
archived at http://perma.cc/P5DL-Y48Z.  
 
37
 See id. 
 
38
 See id. 
 
39
 Id. 
 
40
 See 15 U.S.C. § 6805(a)(7) (2012).   
 
41
 See 15 U.S.C. § 1681w(a)(1) (2012).   
 
42
 See 15 U.S.C. § 6502(b)(1) (2012).  
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to protect the security, confidentiality, and integrity of personal 
information” of consumers.43  In one FACTA disposal rule enforcement 
                                                             
43
 See, e.g., Consent Order at 2–3, In re ACRAnet, Inc., No. C-4331 (F.T.C. Aug. 17, 
2011) [hereinafter ACRAnet Order], 
http://www.ftc.gov/sites/default/files/documents/cases/2011/08/110809acranetdo.pdf, 
archived at http://perma.cc/Y8JS-F3XY; Consent Order at 3, In re Fajilan & Assocs., No. 
C-4332 (F.T.C. Aug. 17, 2011) [hereinafter Fajilan Order], 
http://www.ftc.gov/sites/default/files/documents/cases/2011/08/110819statewidedo.pdf, 
archived at http://perma.cc/ACL8-52FH; Consent Order at 3, In re Franklin’s Budget Car 
Sales, Inc., No. C-4371 (F.T.C. Oct. 3, 2012) [hereinafter Franklin’s Budget Car Order], 
http://www.ftc.gov/sites/default/files/documents/cases/2012/10/121026franklinautomalld
o.pdf, archived at http://perma.cc/GN9L-JL86; Consent Order at 3, In re Goal Financial, 
LLC, No. C-4216 (F.T.C. Apr. 9, 2008) [hereinafter Goal Financial Order], 
http://www.ftc.gov/sites/default/files/documents/cases/2008/04/080415decision_0.pdf, 
archived at http://perma.cc/Z5LF-HEUW; Consent Order at 2, In re James B. Nutter & 
Co., No. C-4258 (F.T.C. June 12, 2009) [hereinafter James B. Nutter & Co. Order], 
http://www.ftc.gov/sites/default/files/documents/cases/2009/06/090616nutterdo.pdf, 
archived at http://perma.cc/887F-PURA; Consent Order at 3, In re Nations Title Agency, 
Inc., No. C-4161 (F.T.C. June 19, 2006) [hereinafter Nations Title Agency Order], 
http://www.ftc.gov/sites/default/files/documents/cases/2006/06/0523117nationstitledecisi
onandorder.pdf, archived at http://perma.cc/D9VY-ZESP; Consent Order at 3, In re 
Premier Capital Lending, Inc., No. C-4241 (F.T.C. Dec. 10, 2008) [hereinafter Premier 
Capital Lending Order], 
http://www.ftc.gov/sites/default/files/documents/cases/2008/12/081216pcldo.pdf, 
archived at http://perma.cc/2XQ9-PL7E; Consent Order at 3, In re SettlementOne Credit 
Corp. & Sackett Nat’l Holdings, Inc., No. C-4330 (F.T.C. Aug. 17, 2011) [hereinafter 
SettlementOne Credit and Sackett National Holdings Order], 
http://www.ftc.gov/sites/default/files/documents/cases/2011/08/110819settlementonedo.p
df, archived at http://perma.cc/7XCG-JEU4.   
 
Early FTC enforcement consent orders under the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Safeguards Rule 
instead simply prohibited future violation of the Safeguards Rule, coupled with periodic 
assessments by a qualified, independent third-party professional to certify that the 
security program is operating with sufficient effectiveness “to provide reasonable 
assurance that the security, confidentiality, and integrity of personal information” is being 
protected.  See, e.g., Consent Order at 5–6, United States v. Am. United Mortg. Co., No. 
07C-7064 (N.D. Ill. Dec. 17, 2007) [hereinafter American United Order], 
http://www.ftc.gov/sites/default/files/documents/cases/2007/12/071217americanunitedmr
tgstipfinal.pdf, archived at http://perma.cc/SY2V-837H; Consent Order at 2–3, In re 
Nationwide Mortg. Grp., Inc., No. 9319 (F.T.C. Apr. 12, 2005) [hereinafter Nationwide 
Order], 
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proceeding, the FTC’s consent order permanently enjoined the defendant 
from violating the Disposal Rule, including any failure “to properly 
dispose of such information by taking reasonable measures to protect 
against unauthorized access to use of the information in connection with 
its disposal.”44  And in COPPA enforcement, the FTC has prohibited a 
respondent from “failing to establish and maintain reasonable procedures 
to protect the confidentiality, security, and integrity of personal 
information collected from children,” and has ordered the establishment of 
“a comprehensive information security program that is reasonably 
designed to protect the security, confidentiality, and integrity of consumer 
personal information . . . .”45   
 
[18] For over a decade, the majority of the FTC’s information security 
enforcement proceedings have been brought under Section 5 of the 
Federal Trade Commission Act, which prohibits “unfair or deceptive acts 
or practices in or affecting commerce.”46  Under the authority of Section 5, 
                                                                                                                                                       
http://www.ftc.gov/sites/default/files/documents/cases/2005/04/050415dod9319.pdf, 
archived at http://perma.cc/J6QA-V3TV; Consent Order at 2–3, In re Sunbelt Lending 
Servs., Inc., No. C-4129 (F.T.C. Jan. 3, 2005) [hereinafter Sunbelt Lending Order], 
http://www.ftc.gov/sites/default/files/documents/cases/2005/01/050107do0423153.pdf, 
archived at http://perma.cc/J6QA-V3TV. 
 
44
 See, e.g., Consent Order at 6, FTC v. Navone, No. 2:08-CV-01842 (D. Nev. Dec. 29, 
2009) [hereinafter Navone Order], 
http://www.ftc.gov/sites/default/files/documents/cases/2010/01/100120navonestip.pdf, 
archived at http://perma.cc/S396-YLVK. 
 
45
 See Consent Order at 5, 8, In re RockYou, Inc., No. 12-CV-1487 (F.T.C. Mar. 27, 
2012) [hereinafter RockYou Order], 
http://www.ftc.gov/sites/default/files/documents/cases/2012/03/120327rockyouorder.pdf. 
archived at http://perma.cc/9AUR-RBB9; see also Consent Order at 12–13, United States 
v. Path, Inc., No. 13-CV-00448-RS (N.D. Cal. Feb. 8, 2013) [hereinafter Path Order], 
http://www.ftc.gov/sites/default/files/documents/cases/2013/02/130201pathincdo.pdf 
(ordering defendant to establish and maintain “a comprehensive privacy program that is 
reasonably designed to . . . protect the privacy and confidentiality of covered 
information”), archived at http://perma.cc/Y8V4-LTPH.   
 
46
 15 U.S.C. § 45(a)(1) (2012). 
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the FTC enforces information security through one or a combination of 
two prohibitions.  First, if a company makes representations—such as 
statements within its privacy policy—that it will maintain particular 
safeguards or provide a certain level of security for customer information, 
yet fails to do so, the FTC may proceed under the deceptiveness prong of 
Section 5.
47
  Conversely, without reference to any alleged 
misrepresentation regarding information security, the FTC may instead 
pursue a company under the unfairness prong of Section 5.
48
  In an 
unfairness claim, however, the FTC must also allege and establish that 
“the act or practice causes or is likely to cause substantial injury to 
consumers which is not reasonably avoidable by consumers themselves 
and not outweighed by countervailing benefits to consumers or to 
competition.”49  In at least fifteen concluded enforcement matters in the 
last twelve years, the FTC has pursued companies solely under a Section 5 
deception theory, with no companion claims under Gramm-Leach-Bliley, 
FACTA, or COPPA, and therefore with no underlying, specific regulatory 
standards for prescribed safeguards.
50
  In each of these matters the 
                                                             
47
 See, e.g., Complaint at 5, In re Twitter, Inc., No. C-4316 (F.T.C. Mar. 2, 2011) 
[hereinafter Twitter Complaint], 
http://www.ftc.gov/sites/default/files/documents/cases/2011/03/110311twittercmpt.pdf, 
archived at http://perma.cc/B7MB-EXCR. 
 
48
 See, e.g., Complaint at 3, In re Dave & Buster’s, Inc., No. C-4291 (F.T.C. May 20, 
2010) [hereinafter Dave & Buster’s Complaint], 
http://www.ftc.gov/sites/default/files/documents/cases/2010/06/100608davebusterscmpt.
pdf. 
 
49
 15 U.S.C. § 45(n) (2012); see, e.g., Dave & Buster’s Complaint at 3. 
 
50
 See, e.g., Complaint at 11–14, FTC v. LifeLock, Inc., No. 072-3069 (D. Ariz. Mar. 8, 
2010) [hereinafter LifeLock Complaint], 
http://www.ftc.gov/sites/default/files/documents/cases/2010/03/100309lifelockcmpt.pdf, 
archived at http://perma.cc/A98N-JT5D; Complaint at 13–14, United States v. 
ValueClick, Inc., No. CV08-01711 MMM (RZx) (C.D. Cal. Mar. 13, 2008) [hereinafter 
ValueClick Complaint], 
http://www.ftc.gov/sites/default/files/documents/cases/2008/03/080317complaint.pdf, 
archived at http://perma.cc/4T9R-5Y3H; Complaint at 4, In re Cbr Sys., Inc., No. C-4400 
(F.T.C. Apr. 29, 2013) [hereinafter Cbr Systems Complaint], 
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resulting consent order required the company to establish a comprehensive 
information security program that is “reasonably designed to protect the 
security, confidentiality, and integrity” of consumer information.51  During 
                                                                                                                                                       
http://www.ftc.gov/sites/default/files/documents/cases/2013/05/130503cbrcmpt.pdf, 
archived at http://perma.cc/T2LS-TDTP; Complaint at 5–6, In re Credit Karma, Inc., No. 
C-4480 (F.T.C. Aug. 13, 2014) [hereinafter Credit Karma Complaint], 
http://www.ftc.gov/system/files/documents/cases/1408creditkarmacmpt.pdf, archived at 
http://perma.cc/NL4H-AXFH; Complaint at 3, In re Eli Lily & Co., No. C-4047 (F.T.C. 
May 8, 2002) [hereinafter Eli Lily Complaint], 
http://www.ftc.gov/sites/default/files/documents/cases/2002/05/elilillycmp.htm, archived 
at http://perma.cc/A9UT-FMYV; Complaint at 5, In re Fandango, LLC, No. C-4481 
(F.T.C. Aug. 13, 2014) [hereinafter Fandango Complaint], 
http://www.ftc.gov/system/files/documents/cases/140819fandangocmpt.pdf, archived at 
http://perma.cc/93CF-9LYT; Complaint at 3, In re Genica Corp., No. C-4252 (F.T.C. 
Mar. 16, 2009) [hereinafter Genica Complaint], 
http://www.ftc.gov/sites/default/files/documents/cases/2009/03/090320genicacmpt.pdf, 
archived at http://perma.cc/KR2Q-QJVA; Complaint at 3, In re Guess?, Inc., No. C-4091 
(F.T.C. July 30, 2003) [hereinafter Guess Complaint], 
http://www.ftc.gov/sites/default/files/documents/cases/2003/08/guesscomp.pdf, archived 
at http://perma.cc/6PRC-ZJ5P; Complaint at 3, In re Guidance Software, Inc., No. C-
4187 (F.T.C. Mar. 30, 2007) [hereinafter Guidance Software Complaint], 
http://www.ftc.gov/sites/default/files/documents/cases/2007/04/0623057complaint.pdf, 
archived at http://perma.cc/WC6Y-ZSL7; Complaint at 3, In re Life is Good, Inc., No. C-
4218 (F.T.C. Apr. 16, 2008) [hereinafter Life is Good Complaint], 
http://www.ftc.gov/sites/default/files/documents/cases/2008/04/080418complaint.pdf, 
archived at http://perma.cc/G9W3-4Y32; Complaint at 5, In re Microsoft Corp., No. C-
4069 (F.T.C. Dec. 20, 2002) [hereinafter Microsoft Complaint], 
http://www.ftc.gov/sites/default/files/documents/cases/2002/08/microsoftcmp.pdf, 
archived at http://perma.cc/8GSM-ZJSX; Complaint at 4, In re MTS, Inc. & Tower 
Direct, LLC, No. C-4110 (F.T.C. May 28, 2004) [hereinafter MTS and Tower Direct 
Complaint], 
http://www.ftc.gov/sites/default/files/documents/cases/2004/06/040602comp0323209.pdf
, archived at http://perma.cc/VV56-DQPN; Complaint at 5-6, 8, In re Myspace LLC, No. 
C-4369 (F.T.C. Aug. 30, 2012) [hereinafter Myspace Complaint], 
http://www.ftc.gov/sites/default/files/documents/cases/2012/09/120911myspacecmpt.pdf 
(also alleging misrepresentations regarding U.S. Safe Harbor adherence), archived at 
http://perma.cc/M2QB-FRWZ; Complaint at 4, In re Petco Animal Supplies, Inc., No. C-
4133 (F.T.C. Mar. 4, 2004) [hereinafter Petco Complaint], 
http://www.ftc.gov/sites/default/files/documents/cases/2005/03/050308comp0323221.pdf
, archived at http://perma.cc/YSW7-4DUY; Twitter Complaint at 5.   
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51
 See, e.g., Consent Order at 5, FTC v. LifeLock, Inc., No. 072-3069 (D. Ariz. Mar. 9, 
2010) [hereinafter LifeLock Order], 
http://www.ftc.gov/sites/default/files/documents/cases/2010/03/100309lifelockstip.pdf, 
archived at http://perma.cc/M55H-ZMHX; Consent Order at 9–10, United States v. 
ValueClick, Inc., No. CV08-01711 MMM (RZx) (C.D. Cal. Mar. 17, 2008) [hereinafter 
ValueClick Order], 
http://www.ftc.gov/sites/default/files/documents/cases/2008/03/080317judgment.pdf, 
archived at http://perma.cc/J5EG-J8H6; Consent Order at 3, In re Cbr Systems, Inc., No. 
C-4400 (F.T.C. Apr. 29, 2013) [hereinafter Cbr Systems Order], 
http://www.ftc.gov/sites/default/files/documents/cases/2013/05/130503cbrdo.pdf, 
archived at http://perma.cc/9ZZZ-SD5T; Consent Order at 3, In re Credit Karma, Inc., 
No. C-4480 (F.T.C. Aug. 13, 2014) [hereinafter Credit Karma Order], 
http://www.ftc.gov/system/files/documents/cases/1408creditkarmado.pdf, archived at 
http://perma.cc/T66M-F539; Consent Order at II., In re Eli Lily & Co., No. C-4047 
(F.T.C. May 8, 2002) [hereinafter Eli Lily Order], 
http://www.ftc.gov/sites/default/files/documents/cases/2002/05/elilillydo.htm, archived at 
http://perma.cc/9PUG-6F5T; Consent Order at 3, In re Fandango, LLC, No. C-4481 
(F.T.C. Aug. 13, 2014) [hereinafter Fandango Order], 
http://www.ftc.gov/system/files/documents/cases/140819fandangodo.pdf, archived at 
http://perma.cc/3RTB-SEDK; Consent Order at 3, In re Genica Corp., No. C-4252 
(F.T.C. Mar. 16, 2009) [hereinafter Genica Order], 
http://www.ftc.gov/sites/default/files/documents/cases/2009/03/090320genicado.pdf, 
archived at http://perma.cc/Q7A3-QMC2; Consent Order at 3, In re Guess?, Inc., No. C-
4091 (F.T.C. July 30, 2003) [hereinafter Guess Order], 
http://www.ftc.gov/sites/default/files/documents/cases/2003/08/guessdo.pdf, archived at 
http://perma.cc/XWG3-EKXP; Consent Order at 2–3, In re Guidance Software, Inc., No. 
C-4187 (F.T.C. Mar. 30, 2007) [hereinafter Guidance Software Order], 
http://www.ftc.gov/sites/default/files/documents/cases/2007/04/0623057do.pdf, archived 
at http://perma.cc/6FSC-ZTK2; Consent Order at 3, In re Life is Good, Inc., No. C-4218 
(F.T.C. Apr. 16, 2008) [hereinafter Life is Good Order], 
http://www.ftc.gov/sites/default/files/documents/cases/2008/04/080418do.pdf, archived 
at http://perma.cc/R7QA-WAFF; Consent Order at 2–3, In re Microsoft Corp., No. C-
4069 (F.T.C. Dec. 20, 2002) [hereinafter Microsoft Order], 
http://www.ftc.gov/sites/default/files/documents/cases/2002/12/microsoftdecision.pdf, 
archived at http://perma.cc/N88X-WDCT; Consent Order at 3, In re MTS, Inc., & Tower 
Direct, LLC, No. C-4110 (F.T.C. May 28, 2004) [hereinafter MTS and Tower Direct 
Order], 
http://www.ftc.gov/sites/default/files/documents/cases/2004/06/040602do0323209.pdf, 
archived at http://perma.cc/AC24-5PH2; Consent Order at 3, In re Myspace LLC, No. C-
4369 (F.T.C. Aug. 30, 2012) [hereinafter Myspace Order], 
http://www.ftc.gov/sites/default/files/documents/cases/2012/09/120911myspacedo.pdf, , 
archived at http://perma.cc/KXU7-RDF5; Consent Order at II., In re Petco Animal 
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the same time period, the FTC alleged Section 5 information security 
violations under a combination of deception and unfairness theories in 
twelve concluded enforcement matters, and the resulting consent orders 
similarly, and uniformly, compelled the company to establish a 
comprehensive information security program “reasonably designed to 
protect the security, confidentiality, and integrity” of such information.52  
                                                                                                                                                       
Supplies, Inc., No. C-4133 (F.T.C. Mar. 4, 2005) [hereinafter Petco Order], 
http://www.ftc.gov/sites/default/files/documents/cases/2005/03/050308do0323221.pdf, 
archived at http://perma.cc/8AZX-64JE; Consent Order at 3, In re Twitter, Inc., No. C-
4316 (F.T.C. Mar. 2, 2014) [hereinafter Twitter Order], 
http://www.ftc.gov/sites/default/files/documents/cases/2011/03/110311twitterdo.pdf, 
archived at http://perma.cc/22VL-ZPSJ. 
 
52
 See, e.g., Consent Order at 3, In re Ceridian Corp., No. C-4325 (F.T.C. June 8, 2011) 
[hereinafter Ceridian Corp. Order], 
http://www.ftc.gov/sites/default/files/documents/cases/2011/06/110615ceridiando.pdf, 
archived at http://perma.cc/6P5Q-J8B5; Consent Order at 7, In re Compete, Inc., No. C-
4384 (F.T.C. Feb. 20, 2013) [hereinafter Compete Order], 
http://www.ftc.gov/sites/default/files/documents/cases/2013/02/130222competedo.pdf, 
archived at http://perma.cc/YV6U-3LKU; Consent Order at 3, In re CVS Caremark 
Corp., No. C-4259 (F.T.C. June 18, 2009) [hereinafter CVS Order], 
http://www.ftc.gov/sites/default/files/documents/cases/2009/06/090623cvsdo.pdf, 
archived at http://perma.cc/BZ7X-MSS8; Consent Order at 5, In re Facebook, LLC, No. 
C-4365 (F.T.C. July 27, 2012) [hereinafter Facebook Order], 
http://www.ftc.gov/sites/default/files/documents/cases/2012/08/120810facebookdo.pdf, 
archived at http://perma.cc/834G-6G33; Consent Order at 7, In re GeneLink, Inc., No. C-
4456 (F.T.C. May 8, 2014) [hereinafter GeneLink Order], 
http://www.ftc.gov/system/files/documents/cases/140512genelinkdo_0.pdf, archived at 
http://perma.cc/49DZ-W9PU; Consent Order at 3, In re GMR Transcription Services, 
Inc., No. C-4482 (F.T.C. Aug. 14, 2014) [hereinafter GMR Transcription Services 
Order], http://www.ftc.gov/system/files/documents/cases/140821gmrdo.pdf, archived at 
http://perma.cc/CW6G-Y7XM; Consent Order at 3, In re HTC America, Inc., No. C-
4406 (F.T.C. June 25, 2013) [hereinafter HTC America Order], 
http://www.ftc.gov/sites/default/files/documents/cases/2013/07/130702htcdo.pdf, 
archived at http://perma.cc/Q42M-9FX2; Consent Order at 3, In re Lookout Servs., Inc., 
No. C-4326 (F.T.C. June15, 2011) [hereinafter Lookout Services Order], 
http://www.ftc.gov/sites/default/files/documents/cases/2011/06/110615lookoutdo.pdf, 
archived at http://perma.cc/NM4Z-33N6; Consent Order at 3, In re Rite Aid, Corp., No. 
C-4308 (F.T.C. Nov. 12, 2010) [hereinafter Rite Aid Order], 
http://www.ftc.gov/sites/default/files/documents/cases/2010/11/101122riteaiddo.pdf, 
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Notably, in at least eight concluded enforcement matters the FTC has 
pursued companies for allegedly inadequate information security solely 
under the unfairness prong of Section 5.  These matters are of particular 
interest because the FTC’s enforcement claims were neither based on 
specific regulatory standards under Gramm-Leach-Bliley, FACTA, or 
COPPA, nor allegedly deceptive representation regarding security 
safeguards.  In each matter the FTC claimed that a failure to provide 
“reasonable and appropriate” security for protected consumer information 
constituted an unfair act or practice in violation of Section 5.
53
  The 
                                                                                                                                                       
archived at http://perma.cc/8HD5-RH9C; Consent Order at 4, In re TRENDnet, Inc., No. 
C-4426 (F.T.C. Jan. 16, 2014) [hereinafter TRENDnet Order], 
http://www.ftc.gov/system/files/documents/cases/140207trendnetdo.pdf, archived at 
http://perma.cc/N6D3-SVRM; Consent Order at 6, In re Upromise, Inc., No. C-4351 
(F.T.C. Mar. 27, 2012) [hereinafter Upromise Order], 
http://www.ftc.gov/sites/default/files/documents/cases/2012/04/120403upromisedo.pdf, 
archived at http://perma.cc/GRK2-H6QD.  
 
53
 See, e.g., Complaint at 2, In re Accretive Health, Inc., No. C-4432 (F.T.C. Feb. 5, 
2014) [hereinafter Accretive Health Complaint], 
http://www.ftc.gov/system/files/documents/cases/140224accretivehealthcmpt.pdf 
(“Accretive failed to provide reasonable and appropriate security for consumers’ personal 
information it collected and maintained by engaging in a number of practices that, taken 
together, unreasonably and unnecessarily exposed consumers’ personal data to 
unauthorized access.”), archived at http://perma.cc/E2G3-VP4G; Complaint at 2, In re 
BJ’s Wholesale Club, Inc., No. C-4148 (F.T.C. Sept. 20, 2005) [hereinafter BJ’s 
Wholesale Club Complaint], 
http://www.ftc.gov/sites/default/files/documents/cases/2005/09/092305comp0423160.pdf 
(“Respondent did not employ reasonable and appropriate measures to secure personal 
information collected at its stores.”), archived at http://perma.cc/WRK4-ZYBJ; 
Complaint at 2, In re CardSystems Solutions, Inc., No. C-4168 (F.T.C. Sept. 5, 2006) 
[hereinafter CardSystems Solutions Complaint], 
http://www.ftc.gov/sites/default/files/documents/cases/2006/02/0523148complaint.pdf 
(“Respondent . . . failed to provide reasonable and appropriate security for personal 
information stored on its computer network.”), archived at http://perma.cc/ZVD7-355B; 
Dave & Buster’s Complaint at 2 (“In collecting and processing sensitive personal 
information, respondent engaged in a number of practices that, taken together, failed to 
provide reasonable and appropriate security for personal information on its networks.”); 
Complaint at 2, In re DSW Inc., No. C-4157 (F.T.C., Mar. 7, 2006) [hereinafter DSW 
Complaint], 
http://www.ftc.gov/sites/default/files/documents/cases/2005/12/051201comp0523096.pdf 
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consent orders in each of these concluded enforcement matters, true to 
form, required the company to establish and maintain a comprehensive 
information security program “reasonably designed to protect the security, 
confidentiality, and integrity” of collected consumer personal 
information.
54
   
                                                                                                                                                       
(“[R]espondent engaged in a number of practices that, taken together, failed to provide 
reasonable and appropriate security for personal information collected at its stores.”), 
archived at http://perma.cc/X7EK-64T7; Complaint at 2, In re EPN, Inc., No. C-4370 
(F.T.C. Oct. 3, 2012) [hereinafter EPN Complaint], 
http://www.ftc.gov/sites/default/files/documents/cases/2012/10/121026epncmpt.pdf 
(“EPN has engaged in a number of practices that, taken together, failed to provide 
reasonable and appropriate security for personal information on its computers and 
networks.”), archived at http://perma.cc/V3FJ-JVR8; Complaint at 3, In re Reed 
Elsevier, Inc., No. C-4226 (F.T.C. July 29, 2008) [hereinafter Reed Elsevier Complaint], 
http://www.ftc.gov/sites/default/files/documents/cases/2008/03/080327complaint.pdf 
(“[R]espondents engaged in a number of practices that, taken together, failed to provide 
reasonable and appropriate security to prevent unauthorized access to the sensitive 
consumer information stored in databases accessible using Accurint verification products 
. . . .”), archived at http://perma.cc/NJH4-A55Y; Complaint at 2, In re TJX Cos., No. C-
4227 (F.T.C. July 29, 2008) [hereinafter TJX Cos. Complaint], 
http://www.ftc.gov/sites/default/files/documents/cases/2008/03/080327complaint_0.pdf 
(“[R]espondent engaged in a number of practices that, taken together, failed to provide 
reasonable and appropriate security for personal information on it networks.”), archived 
at http://perma.cc/9G6Y-KFTE.   
 
In its pending enforcement matter against LabMD, the FTC complaint similarly alleges 
that LabMD “engaged in a number of practices that, taken together, failed to provide 
reasonable and appropriate security for personal information on its computer networks.”  
See Complaint at 3, In re LabMD, Inc., No. 9357 (F.T.C. Aug. 28, 2013) [hereinafter 
LabMD Complaint], 
http://www.ftc.gov/sites/default/files/documents/cases/2013/08/130829labmdpart3.pdf, 
archived at http://perma.cc/BNL7-2NTU. 
 
54
 See, e.g., Consent Order at 2–3, In re Accretive Health, Inc., No. C-4432 (F.T.C. Feb. 
5, 2014) [hereinafter Accretive Health Order], 
http://www.ftc.gov/system/files/documents/cases/140224accretivehealthdo.pdf, archived 
at http://perma.cc/6ZRT-G79C; Consent Order at 2–3, In re BJ’s Wholesale Club, Inc., 
No. C-4148 (F.T.C. Sept. 20, 2005) [hereinafter BJ’s Wholesale Club Order], 
http://www.ftc.gov/sites/default/files/documents/cases/2005/09/092305do0423160.pdf, 
archived at http://perma.cc/A427-CC4A; Consent Order at 3, In re Cardsystems 
Solutions, Inc., No. C-4168 (F.T.C. Sept. 5, 2006) [hereinafter Cardsystems Solutions 
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[19] The FTC’s information security enforcement under Section 5’s 
unfairness theory has engendered controversy.
55
  In FTC v. Wyndham, the 
United States District Court for the District of New Jersey recently granted 
leave for an interlocutory appeal to the Third Circuit Court of Appeals on 
two certified questions:  
 
(1) Whether the Federal Trade Commission can bring an 
unfairness claim involving data security under Section 5 of 
the Federal Trade Commission Act, 15 U.S.C. § 45(a); and  
 
(2) Whether the Federal Trade Commission must formally 
promulgate regulations before bringing its unfairness claim 
under Section 5 of the Federal Trade Commission Act, 15 
U.S.C. § 45(a).
56
 
                                                                                                                                                       
Order], 
http://www.ftc.gov/sites/default/files/documents/cases/2006/09/0523148cardsystemsdo.p
df, archived at http://perma.cc/9VNW-SYLS; Consent Order at 2–3, In re Dave & 
Buster’s, Inc., No. C-4291 (F.T.C. May 20, 2010) [hereinafter Dave & Buster’s Order], 
http://www.ftc.gov/sites/default/files/documents/cases/2010/06/100608davebustersdo.pdf
, archived at http://perma.cc/4D6L-6V7Z; Consent Order at 2–3, In re DSW Inc., No. C-
4157 (F.T.C. Mar. 7, 2006) [hereinafter DSW Order], 
http://www.ftc.gov/sites/default/files/documents/cases/2006/03/0523096c4157dswdecisio
nandorder.pdf, archived at http://perma.cc/QF8B-LP2N; Consent Order at 2–3, In re 
EPN, Inc., No. C-4370 (F.T.C. Oct. 3, 2012) [hereinafter EPN Order], 
http://www.ftc.gov/sites/default/files/documents/cases/2012/10/121026epndo.pdf, 
archived at http://perma.cc/SYS9-9Z77; Consent Order at 3–4, In re Reed Elsevier, Inc., 
No. C-4226 (F.T.C. July 29, 2008) [hereinafter Reed Elsevier Order], 
http://www.ftc.gov/sites/default/files/documents/cases/2008/08/080801reeddo.pdf, 
archived at http://perma.cc/8VSV-PZ39; Consent Order at 2–3, In re TJX Cos., No. C-
4227 (F.T.C. July 29, 2008) [hereinafter TJX Cos. Order], 
http://www.ftc.gov/sites/default/files/documents/cases/2008/08/080801tjxdo.pdf, 
archived at http://perma.cc/G2TN-9B7U. 
 
55
 See generally Daniel J. Solove & Woodrow Hartzog, The FTC and the New Common 
Law of Privacy, 114 COLUM. L. REV. 583 (2014) (discussing how the FTC has used 
Section 5 to fill a void in sector-specific privacy and data security law). 
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[20] Regardless of the ultimate result of opposition to the FTC’s 
Section 5 enforcement authority, reasonableness remains ubiquitous in 
other expressions of information security law; and so the question of what 
constitutes a reasonable information security program still merits an 
answer. 
 
III.  ELEMENTS OF A REASONABLE INFORMATION SECURITY PROGRAM 
 
[21] Information security is simply not a “one size fits all” endeavor.  
Different organizations in different industries face different threats, 
vulnerabilities, and risks for information security,
57
 and such organizations 
inherently have different sizes, operating environments, and security 
capabilities.  Also, security threats are not static, but instead evolve over 
time and may indeed emerge or shift rapidly.
58
 
 
                                                                                                                                                       
56
 FTC v. Wyndham Worldwide Corp., No. 13-1887 (ES), 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 84914, 
at *15 (D.N.J. June 23, 2014) (order certifying questions for interlocutory review). 
 
57
 Verizon’s 2014 Data Breach Investigations Report analyzed the frequency of security 
incident patterns over the last three years, by industry.  This analysis revealed significant 
industry differences in the nature of security incidents.  For example, the top three 
incident patterns for the Retail industry were Denial of Service, Point-of-Sale Intrusion, 
and Web App Attack.  The most prevalent three incident patterns for the Healthcare 
industry were Theft/Loss, Insider Misuse, and Miscellaneous Error.  For the Utilities 
industry, the top three patterns were Web App Attack, Crime-Ware, and Denial of 
Service.  The three most frequent incident patterns for the Professional industry were 
Denial of Service, Cyber-espionage, and Web App Attack.  And in the Accommodation 
industry, the frequency of Point-of-Sale Intrusion dwarfed all other incident patterns.  See 
2014 Data Breach Investigations Report, VERIZON 15 (2014), available at 
http://www.verizonenterprise.com/DBIR/2014/, archived at http://perma.cc/S9DD-Z7U8.  
 
58
 The 2014 Verizon Report also compares the most prevalent varieties of security threat 
actions per year.  In 2009, the most frequently occurring threat actions were 
Spyware/Key Logger (malware), Backdoor (malware), Use of Stolen Credentials 
(hacking), and Capture Stored Data (malware).  In contrast, for 2013 the most prevalent 
threat actions were Use of Stolen Credentials (hacking), Export Data (malware), Phishing 
(social engineering), and RAM Scraper (malware).  See id. at 10. 
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[22] Recognizing this diversity of circumstances, most information 
security laws explicitly allow for flexibility in establishing security 
safeguards for information.  Under such laws, factors to be considered in 
establishing reasonable security safeguards include: 
 
- The organization’s size and complexity, and the nature and 
scope of its activities;
59
 
 
- The organization’s information security capabilities;60  
 
- The organization’s available resources and the costs of 
security measures;
61
 
                                                             
59
 See 12 C.F.R. pt. 30, app. B(II) (2014) (“appropriate to the size and complexity of the 
institution and the nature and scope of its activities.”) (Interagency Guidelines 
Establishing Information Security Standards under Gramm-Leach-Bliley); 12 C.F.R. pt. 
748, app. A(II)(A) (2014) (“appropriate to the size and complexity of the credit union and 
the nature and scope of its activities.”) (NCUA Guidelines for Safeguarding Member 
Information under Gramm-Leach-Bliley); 16 C.F.R. § 314.3(a) (2014) (“appropriate to 
your size and complexity [and] the nature and scope of your activities . . . .”) (FTC 
Safeguards Rule under Gramm-Leach-Bliley); 45 C.F.R. § 164.306(b)(2)(i) (2013) 
(“[t]he size, complexity, and capabilities of the covered entity or business associate.”) 
(HIPAA Security Rule); see also 201 MASS. CODE REGS. 17.03(1) (2013) (appropriate to 
“the size, scope and type of business of the person obligated to safeguard the personal 
information . . . .”) (Massachusetts Standards for Protection of PII); OR. REV. STAT. § 
646A.622(4) (West 2011) (“appropriate to the size and complexity of the small business 
[and] the nature and scope of its activities . . . .”) (Oregon PII Safeguards Statute). 
 
60
 See, e.g., 45 C.F.R. § 164.306(b)(2)(ii) (2013) (“[t]he covered entity’s or the business 
associate’s technical infrastructure, hardware, and software security capabilities.”) 
(HIPAA Security Rule). 
 
61
 See, e.g., 45 C.F.R. § 164.306(b)(2)(iii) (2013) (“[t]he costs of security measures.”) 
(HIPAA Security Rule); 201 MASS. CODE REGS. 17.03(1)(b) (2014) (“appropriate to . . . 
the amount of resources available to such person . . . .”) (Massachusetts Standards for 
Protection of PII).   
 
On the other hand, the FTC has taken the position in its data security enforcement 
proceedings that some security safeguards are to be expected due to their ready 
availability, allegedly low cost, and common use.  Thus, the FTC has found fault with 
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companies’ failure to implement what it characterizes as readily available, free or low-
cost defenses to commonly known or reasonably foreseeable attacks, such as SQL 
(Structured Query Language) injection attacks and XSS (Cross-Site Scripting) attacks.  
See, e.g., Complaint at 2, In re Ceridian Corp., No. C-4325 (F.T.C. June 8, 2011) 
[hereinafter Ceridian Corp. Complaint], 
http://www.ftc.gov/sites/default/files/documents/cases/2011/06/110615ceridiancmpt.pdf, 
archived at http://perma.cc/9YYT-5JAS; Genica Complaint at 2; Life is Good Complaint 
at 2; LifeLock Complaint at 10; Complaint at 2, In re Nations Title Agency, Inc., No. C-
4161 (F.T.C. June 19, 2006) [hereinafter Nations Title Agency Complaint], 
http://www.ftc.gov/sites/default/files/documents/cases/2006/06/0523117nationstitle_com
plaint.pdf, archived at http://perma.cc/9N63-5HXG; Reed Elsevier Complaint at 4.   
The FTC has also focused on companies’ failure to adopt “reasonably available” security 
measures to limit access between networks, such as employing firewalls or otherwise 
isolating systems with sensitive personal information.  See, e.g., Complaint at 10, FTC v. 
Wyndham Worldwide Corp., No. CV 12-1365-PHX-PGR (D. Ariz. Aug. 9, 2012) 
[hereinafter Wyndham Worldwide Complaint], 
http://www.ftc.gov/sites/default/files/documents/cases/2012/08/120809wyndhamcmpt.pd
f, archived at http://perma.cc/R8J4-G6JA; Dave & Buster’s Complaint at 2; Genica 
Complaint at 2–3; TJX Cos. Complaint at 2.   
 
Further, the FTC has considered “readily available” security measures to limit access to 
computer networks through wireless access points.  See, e.g., Dave & Buster’s Complaint 
at 2; Complaint at 13, In re GeneLink, Inc., & foru
TM
 Int'l Corp., No. C-4456 (F.T.C. 
May 8, 2014) [hereinafter GeneLink and foru
TM
 Complaint], 
http://www.ftc.gov/system/files/documents/cases/140512genelinkcmpt.pdf, archived at 
http://perma.cc/APU8-4UUQ; Life is Good Complaint at 2; TJX Cos. Complaint at 2.   
 
FTC enforcement proceedings also reference failures to implement or follow a variety of 
other “well known” or “commonly accepted” security practices, including the use of a 
commonly used algorithm to screen out credit card numbers.  See, e.g., Complaint at 4–5, 
In re Compete, Inc., No. C-4384 (F.T.C. Feb. 20, 2013) [hereinafter Compete 
Complaint], 
http://www.ftc.gov/sites/default/files/documents/cases/2013/02/130222competecmpt.pdf, 
archived at http://perma.cc/2DW3-43CX; commonly accepted and well known secure 
programming practices, including practices described in guidance documentation for 
software manufactures and developers, Complaint at 2, In re HTC America, Inc., No. C-
4406 (F.T.C. June 25, 2013) [hereinafter HTC America Complaint], 
http://www.ftc.gov/sites/default/files/documents/cases/2013/07/130702htccmpt.pdf, 
archived at http://perma.cc/Y4UB-WD7A; readily available security measures to prevent 
unauthorized access, including installing patches and critical updates to the company’s 
network, LifeLock Complaint at 10; readily available, low-cost measures to address risks 
of a software program collecting sensitive information in an unauthorized manner, 
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The amount and sensitivity of the information at issue, and 
the degree of risk to its security.
62
 
[23] Though there cannot be a single, uniform set of specific safeguards 
that comprise a reasonable security program for every organization in 
every industry, common elements nevertheless emerge from the various 
information safeguard laws and standards.  Based on review of 
information security laws and guidance contained in ISO 27002 and the 
NIST Cybersecurity Framework, a reasonable information security 
program should include the six elements discussed below, consistent with 
applicable legal requirements, the organization’s obligations to third-
parties, and the organization’s strategic approach to risk. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                                                                                                                       
Complaint at 4, In re Upromise, Inc., No. C-4351 (F.T.C. Mar. 27, 2012) [hereinafter 
Upromise Complaint], 
http://www.ftc.gov/sites/default/files/documents/cases/2012/04/120403upromisecmpt.pdf
, archived at http://perma.cc/ZZ2G-XEWB; and commonly used safeguards for requiring 
strong user passwords, Wyndham Worldwide Complaint at 11.  
 
62
 See, e.g., 12 C.F.R. pt. 30, app. B(III)(C)(1) (2014) (“commensurate with the 
sensitivity of the information . . . .”) (Interagency Guidelines Establishing Information 
Security Standards under Gramm-Leach-Bliley); 12 C.F.R. pt. 748, app. A(III)(C)(1) 
(2014) (“commensurate with the sensitivity of information . . . .”) (NCUA Guidelines for 
Safeguarding Member Information under Gramm-Leach-Bliley); 16 C.F.R. § 314.3(a) 
(2014) (“appropriate to . . . the sensitivity of any customer information at issue.”) (FTC 
Safeguards Rule under Gramm-Leach-Bliley); 45 C.F.R. § 164.306(b)(2)(iv) (2013) 
(“[t]he probability and criticality of potential risks to electronic protected health 
information.”) (HIPAA Security Rule); 201 MASS. CODE REGS. 17.03(1) (2013) 
(appropriate to “the amount of stored data; and the need for security and confidentiality 
of both consumer and employee information.”) (Massachusetts Standards for Protection 
of PII); OR. REV. STAT. § 646A.622(4) (West 2011) (“appropriate to . . . the sensitivity of 
the personal information collected from or about consumers [by the small business].”) 
(Oregon PII Safeguards Statute). 
Richmond Journal of Law & Technology                              Volume XXI, Issue 1 
 
29 
 
A.   Identify 
 
An Organization Should Identify the Types of Information 
in Its Possession, Custody, or Control for Which It Will 
Establish Security Safeguards (“Protected Information”) 
 
[24] To establish a reasonable information security program, an 
organization should begin by identifying the types of information for 
which it will implement security safeguards.  In so doing, the organization 
should consider applicable legal requirements to such safeguards, the 
organization’s information security obligations to third-parties, and the 
organization’s strategic approach to risk management.63 
 
1.   Information with Legally Required Safeguards 
 
[25] In the United States, a mosaic of legal requirements mandate 
security for different types of regulated information.
64
  Organizations 
                                                             
63
 The FTC has published guidance on data security in Protecting Personal Information: 
A Guide for Business.  Federal Trade Comm’n, Protecting Personal Information: A 
Guide for Business, BUREAU OF CONSUMER PROTECTION BUSINESS CENTER (2011), 
available at http://www.business.ftc.gov/documents/bus69-protecting-personal-
information-guide-business [hereinafter FTC Business Guidance].  The first of the FTC’s 
five guidance principles, “Take Stock,” is “[k]now what personal information you have in 
your files and on your computers.”  Id. at 3, 5. 
 
64
 Beyond the legal requirements for information safeguards discussed in this section, a 
wide variety of laws simply require that specified types of information be kept 
confidential or must not be disclosed, without addressing the means by which that result 
must be accomplished.  For example, under the Family Educational Rights and Privacy 
Act (FERPA), personally identifiable information in education records may not be 
released or accessed without consent or proper authorization.  See, e.g., 20 U.S.C. § 
1232g(b)(1) (2012); 34 C.F.R. § 99.30 (2013) (FERPA disclosure regulations).   
 
Employee medical records must be maintained confidentially by employers pursuant to 
regulations under various statutes applicable to the workplace.  See 29 C.F.R. § 
825.500(g) (2013) (covering the Family Medical Leave Act (FMLA)); 29 C.F.R. § 
1630.14(b)–(d) (2013) (the Americans With Disabilities Act (ADA)); 29 C.F.R. § 
1635.9(a)(1) (2013) (the Genetic Information Nondiscrimination Act (GINA)).   
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should determine what information they are must safeguard under these 
explicit legal requirements.    
 
a.  HIPAA PHI 
 
[26] Under the HIPAA Security Rule, covered entities and business 
associates must safeguard electronic protected health information 
(“ePHI”) of the covered entity.65  PHI is individually identifiable health 
information, which (1) “[i]s created or received by a health care provider, 
health plan, employer, or health care clearinghouse;” (2) relates to the 
individual’s physical or mental health, the provision of health care to the 
individual, or payment for providing such health care; and (3) either 
identifies the individual or reasonably could be used to identify the 
individual.
66
 
 
[27] HIPAA’s Security Rule applies only to HIPAA covered entities 
and business associates.
67
  Covered entities include health plans, health 
care clearing houses, and health care providers who transmit health 
information electronically in HIPAA covered transactions, such as 
reimbursement.
68
  Business associates are generally third-parties that 
                                                                                                                                                       
Occupational Safety and Health Administration regulations require confidentiality of 
employee names and personally identifiable information in certain disclosures of 
workplace injury and illness reporting, 29 C.F.R. § 1904.29(b)(10) (2013), and 
confidentiality for privacy concern case numbers and employee names, 29 C.F.R. § 
1904.29(b)(6) (2013). 
 
65
 See 45 C.F.R. § 164.302 (2013). 
 
66
 See 45 C.F.R. § 160.103 (2013) (defining “protected health information and 
individually identifiable health information”).  Electronic PHI is PHI that is transmitted 
by or maintained in electronic media.  See id. (defining “electronic protected health 
information”). 
 
67
 See 45 C.F.R. § 164.302 (2013). 
 
68
 See 45 C.F.R. § 160.103 (2013) (defining “covered entity”). 
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create, receive, maintain, or transmit PHI on behalf of a covered entity, or 
that provide services to or for a covered entity (including legal, actuarial, 
accounting, consulting, data aggregation, management, administration, or 
financial services) that involve disclosure of PHI to the third-party.
69
  
Additionally, if a subcontractor creates, receives, maintains, or transmits 
PHI on behalf of the business associate, the subcontractor will also have 
business associate status under HIPAA.
70
   
 
[28] The applicability of HIPAA is not always intuitive.  For example, 
individually identifiable health information held by an employer’s self-
insured health plan would be subject to HIPAA, but the same type of 
health information in the human resources files of a general employer 
would not be covered by HIPAA, because merely being an employer does 
not trigger HIPAA covered entity status.
71
  This distinction exists even if 
the employer is itself a HIPAA covered entity because individually 
identifiable health information “[i]n employment records held by the 
covered entity in its role as employer” is excluded from the definition of 
PHI.
72
  
 
[29] Unlike PHI held by an employer’s self-insured health plan, similar 
medical records held by an employer’s self-insured worker’s 
compensation plan do not trigger HIPAA security requirements, because 
workers’ compensation and other liability insurance is excluded from the 
definition of a HIPAA covered health plan.
73
   
                                                             
69
 See 45 C.F.R. § 160.103 (2013) (defining “business associate”). 
 
70
 See 45 C.F.R. § 160.103 (2013). 
 
71
 See 45 C.F.R. § 160.103 (defining “covered entity”). 
 
72
 See id. (defining “protected health information”). 
 
73
 See, e.g., 45 C.F.R. § 160.103 (2013) (defining “health plan” as excluding plans 
providing for excepted benefits under 42 U.S.C. § 300gg-91(c)(1)); 42 U.S.C. § 300gg-
91(c)(1) (2012) (excepting different categories of benefits, including liability insurance, 
workers’ compensation, or similar insurance). 
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[30] Non-health care businesses, such as cloud service providers, banks, 
and law firms are nevertheless subject to HIPAA as business associates if 
they receive or maintain a covered entity’s PHI.74   
 
[31] Though the HIPAA Security Rule is limited to electronic PHI, 
covered entities and business associates must also safeguard PHI in paper 
media to avoid violating the HIPAA Privacy Rule.
75
  For example, after 
Parkview Health System employees returned seventy-one cardboard boxes 
of paper medical records to a retired physician by leaving them unattended 
on the physician’s home driveway, the resulting investigation conducted 
by the U.S. Department of Health and Human Services’ Office of Civil 
Rights resulted in an $800,000 resolution payment and corrective action 
plan for Parkview; in light of Parkview having violated the HIPAA 
Privacy Rules’ requirement to safeguard PHI.76  
 
b.  Gramm-Leach-Bliley Customer Information 
 
[32] Under the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act, financial institutions must 
protect the security and confidentiality of their customers’ nonpublic 
personal information,
77
 which is “personally identifiable financial 
information provided by a consumer to a financial institution; resulting 
from any transaction with the consumer or any service performed for the 
consumer; or otherwise obtained by the financial institution.”78  Gramm-
                                                             
74
 See 45 C.F.R. § 160.103 (2013) (defining “business associate”). 
 
75
 See 45 C.F.R. § 164.502(a) (2013). 
 
76
 See, e.g., Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Health & Human Servs., $800,000 HIPAA 
Settlement in Medical Records Dumping Case (June 23, 2014), available at 
http://www.hhs.gov/news/press/2014pres/06/20140623a.html, archived at 
http://perma.cc/Z7NL-9C3P. 
 
77
 See 15 U.S.C. § 6801(a) (2012). 
 
78
 15 U.S.C. § 6809(4) (2012). 
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Leach-Bliley contains the related but distinct terms “consumer” and 
“customer.”  Consumers are individuals who “obtain[], from a financial 
institution, financial products or services which are to be used primarily 
for personal, family, or household purposes . . . .” 79   Customer 
relationships are defined by the regulations promulgated under the 
Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act.
80
  Thus, under the FTC regulations, customers 
are consumers who have a continuing relationship with a financial 
institution that “provide[s] one or more financial products or services to 
the consumer that are to be used primarily for personal, family, or 
household purposes”.81   
 
[33] Financial institutions covered by Gramm-Leach-Bliley generally 
include any institution in the business of engaging in financial activities 
under the Bank Holding Company Act, including institutions engaged in 
activities that are a “proper incident” to banking under Federal Reserve 
Board regulation.
82
   
 
c.  FACTA Consumer Information 
 
[34] Disposal Rule regulations promulgated under FACTA require 
proper disposal of consumer information and compilations of “consumer 
information, derived from consumer reports for a business purpose . . . .”83  
                                                             
79
 15 U.S.C. § 6809(9) (2012). 
 
80
 See 15 U.S.C. § 6809(11) (2012). 
 
81
 16 C.F.R. § 313.3(h)(i)(1) (2014). 
 
82
 See 12 U.S.C. § 1843(k)(4)(F) (2012) (Bank Holding Company Act); 12 C.F.R. § 
225.28 (2014) (Federal Reserve Board regulation).  The Federal Trade Commission 
regulations contain further specific examples of financial institutions.  See, e.g., 16 C.F.R. 
§ 313.3(k)(2) (2014). 
 
83
 See 15 U.S.C. § 1681w(a)(1) (2012); see also 12 C.F.R. § 41.83(b) (2014); 12 C.F.R 
pt. 30, app. B(III)(C)(4) (2014); 12 C.F.R. § 222.83(b) (2014); 12 C.F.R. pt. 208, app. D-
2(III)(C)(4) (2014); 12 C.F.R. § 334.83(a) (2014); 12 C.F.R. pt. 364, app. B(III)(C)(4) 
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Consumers are individuals,
84
 and consumer reports include written 
communication of any information by a consumer reporting agency 
bearing on a consumer’s credit, “character, general reputation, personal 
characteristics, or mode of living,” to be used or collected as “a factor in 
establishing the consumer’s eligibility for credit or insurance to be used 
primarily for personal, family, or household purposes, employment 
purposes; or any other [specified] purpose[s].” 85 
 
d.  COPPA Online Personal Information 
 
[35] Regulations under COPPA require safeguards for personal 
information that covered websites or online services collect from 
children.
86
  Children are individuals under the age of thirteen,
87
 and 
personal information is individually identifiable information collected 
online that  
 
[I]nclud[es] a first and last name; a home or other physical 
address including street name and name of city or town; an 
e-mail address; a telephone number; a Social Security 
number; . . . or information concerning the child or the 
parents of that child that the website collects online from 
the child and combines with [any specified] identifier; [or] 
any other identifier that the [Federal Trade] Commission 
determines permits the physical or online contacting of a 
specific [child].
88
  
                                                                                                                                                       
(2014); 12 C.F.R. § 717.83(a) (2014); 12 C.F.R. pt. 748, app. A(III)(C)(4) (2014); 16 
C.F.R. § 682.3(a) (2014); 17 C.F.R. § 248.30(b)(2) (2014). 
 
84
 See 15 U.S.C. § 1681a(c) (2012). 
 
85
 See 15 U.S.C. § 1681a(d)(1)(A)–(C) (2012). 
 
86
 See 15 U.S.C. § 6502(b)(1)(D) (2012). 
 
87
 See 15 U.S.C. § 6501(1) (2012). 
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e.  State-Level PII 
 
[36] Virtually every state (except Alabama, New Mexico, and South 
Dakota) requires persons or organizations possessing PII of their residents 
to notify residents of security breaches concerning their PII.
89
  Several 
states affirmatively require reasonable security procedures and practices to 
protect resident’s PII, and others require either a destruction policy or 
secure means of disposal for such PII.
90
  These laws generally apply to PII 
in computerized form, but at least nine jurisdictions apply some or all of 
their safeguards and notification requirements to PII in both computerized 
and hard copy form.
91
  Effective encryption of electronic PII is generally a 
safe harbor for breach notification obligations.
92
 
                                                                                                                                                       
88
 See 15 U.S.C. § 6501(8) (2012).  FTC regulations add additional identifiers, including 
online contact information as defined in the regulations; screen or user names that 
function in the same manner as online contact information; persistent identifiers that can 
be used to recognize users over time and across different websites or online services, 
such as customer numbers held in a cookie, IP addresses, processor or device serial 
numbers, or unique device identifiers; photograph, video, or audio files containing a 
child’s image or voice; and geolocation information sufficient to identify street and city 
or town names.  See 16 C.F.R. § 312.2 (2014) (defining “personal information”). 
 
89
 See, e.g., GINA STEVENS, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R42475, DATA SECURITY BREACH 
NOTIFICATION LAWS 4 (2012) (citation omitted).  In 2014, Kentucky became the forty-
seventh state to enact a breach notification law.  See KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 365.732(2) 
(LexisNexis Supp. 2014).  Puerto Rico, Guam, and the U.S. Virgin Islands also have PII 
breach notification requirements.  See P.R. LAWS ANN. tit. 10, § 4052 (2012); 9 GUAM 
CODE ANN. § 48.30(a) (2013); V.I. CODE ANN. tit. 14, § 2209(a) (2013). 
 
90
 See infra notes 282–99. 
 
91
 See, e.g., ALASKA STAT. § 45.48.090(7) (2012); ARK. CODE ANN. § 4-110-103(5) 
(Supp. 2011) (medical information only); HAW. REV. STAT. ANN. § 487N-1 (LexisNexis 
Supp. 2012); IND. CODE ANN. § 24-4.9-2-2(a) (2013); MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 93H, § 1(a) 
(2012); N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 75-61(12), (14) (2013); P.R. LAWS ANN. tit. 10, § 4051(a) 
(2012); S.C. CODE ANN. § 39-1-90(A) (Supp. 2013); WIS. STAT. § 134.98(1)(c)(1) 
(2012). 
 
92
 See, e.g., VA. CODE ANN. § 18.2-186.6(A) (Supp. 2014). 
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[37] The several states commonly define PII as a combination of the 
resident’s name and any information in additional categories, such as the 
resident’s Social Security number, driver’s or state identification number, 
or financial account or card numbers with account access information—
such as security or access codes or PINs.
93
  However, some states add 
additional categories of combined information, including medical 
information (Arkansas, California, Florida, Missouri, Puerto Rico, and 
Texas);
94
 health insurance information (California, Florida, Missouri, 
North Dakota, and Texas);
95
 unique biometric data or DNA profiles (Iowa, 
Nebraska, North Carolina, Texas, and Wisconsin);
96
 taxpayer 
identification numbers or other tax information (Maryland and Puerto 
Rico);
97
 digital signatures (North Carolina, North Dakota, and Texas);
98
 
electronic identification numbers, e-mail names or addresses, and Internet 
account numbers or identification names (Florida and North Carolina);
99
 
                                                             
93
 See, e.g., § 18.2-186.6(A). 
 
94
 See ARK. CODE ANN. § 4-110-103(7)(D) (Supp. 2011); CAL. CIV. CODE § 1798.82(h) 
(Deering 2005); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 501.171(1)(g)(1) (2014); MO. REV. STAT. § 
407.1500.1(9)(e)–(f) (Supp. 2011); P.R. LAWS ANN. tit. 10, § 4051(a)(5) (2012); TEX. 
BUS. & COM. CODE ANN. § 521.002(a)(2)(B) (West 2009 & Supp. 2014). 
 
95
 See CAL. CIV. CODE  § 1798.82(h) (Deering 2005); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 
501.171(1)(g)(1) (2014); MO. REV. STAT. § 407.1500.1(9)(f) (Supp. 2011); N.D. CENT. 
CODE § 51-30-01(4)(a)(8) (2007 & Supp. 2013); TEX. BUS. & COM. CODE ANN. § 
521.002(a)(2) (West 2009 & Supp. 2014). 
 
96
 See IOWA CODE § 715C.1(11)(e) (2013); NEB. REV. STAT. § 87-802(5)(e) (2008); N.C. 
GEN. STAT. §§ 14-113.20(b)(11)–(12), 75-61(10) (2013); TEX. BUS. & COM. CODE ANN. 
§ 521.002(a)(1)(C) (West 2009 & Supp. 2014); WIS. STAT. § 134.98(1)(b)(4)–(5) (2012). 
 
97
 See MD. CODE ANN., COM. LAW § 14-3501(d)(1)(iv) (LexisNexis Supp. 2013); P.R. 
LAWS ANN. tit. 10, § 4051(a)(6) (2012). 
 
98
 See N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 14-113.20(b)(9), 75–61(10) (2013); N.D. CENT. CODE § 
51-30-01(4)(a)(10) (2007 & Supp. 2013); TEX. BUS. & COM. CODE ANN. § 
521.002(a)(1)(D) (West 2009 & Supp. 2014). 
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employment identification numbers (North Dakota);
100
 birth dates (North 
Dakota and Texas);
101
 parents’ surnames before marriage, such as maiden 
names (North Carolina, North Dakota, and Texas);
102
 and work-related 
evaluations (Puerto Rico).
103
  Georgia and Maine provide that information 
in their combination categories can constitute protected PII in the absence 
of the resident’s name if such information would sufficiently enable 
identity theft.
104
  In Florida, a user name or e-mail address combined with 
a password or security question and answer, permitting access to an online 
account, is protected PII even without the resident’s name.105 
 
f.  FTC Act Section 5 Protected Information 
 
[38] In FTC enforcement actions under Section 5 of the FTC Act, not 
involving enforcement of Gramm-Leach-Bliley, FACTA, or COPPA, the 
most common type of protected information is nonpublic personal 
information conducive to identity theft, including consumer names, 
physical and e-mail addresses and telephone numbers, Social Security 
numbers, purchase card numbers, card expiration dates and security codes, 
financial account numbers, and driver’s license or other government-
                                                                                                                                                       
99
 See FLA. STAT. ANN. § 501.171(1)(g)(1)(b) (2014); N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 14-
113.20(b)(8), 75-61(10) (2013). 
 
100
 See N.D. CENT. CODE § 51-30-01(4)(a)(9) (2007 & Supp. 2013). 
 
101
 See § 51-30-01(4)(a)(5); TEX. BUS. & COM. CODE ANN. § 521.002(a)(1)(A) (West 
2009 & Supp. 2014). 
 
102
 See N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 14-113.20(b)(14), 75-61(10) (2013); N.D. CENT. CODE § 
51-30-01(4)(a)(6) (2007 & Supp. 2013); TEX. BUS. & COM. CODE ANN. § 
521.002(a)(1)(B) (West 2009 & Supp. 2014). 
 
103
 See P.R. LAWS ANN. tit. 10, § 4051(a)(7) (2012). 
 
104
 See GA. CODE ANN. § 10-1-911(6)(E) (2009); ME. REV. STAT. tit. 10, § 
1347(6)(E) (Supp. 2013). 
 
105
 See FLA. STAT. ANN. § 501.171(1)(g)(1)(b) (2014). 
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issued identification numbers.
106
  These categories of information are 
familiar territory under state laws protecting PII.  In Section 5 enforcement 
actions against healthcare-related entities, the FTC has also treated 
additional categories of nonpublic personal information as requiring 
safeguards, including patient names with billing information and 
diagnostic information;
107
 physician names, insurance numbers, diagnosis 
codes, and medical visit types;
108
 medical record numbers, healthcare 
provider names, addresses, and phone numbers, lab tests and test codes, 
lab results and diagnoses, clinical histories, and health insurance company 
names and policy numbers;
109
 prescription medications and dosages, 
                                                             
106
 See, e.g., Accretive Health Complaint at 2; see also Wyndham Worldwide Complaint 
at 7; ValueClick Complaint at 9–10; BJ’s Wholesale Club Complaint at 2–3; 
Cardsystems Solutions Complaint at 1, 3; Cbr Systems Complaint at 1–2, 4; Ceridian 
Corp. Complaint at 2–3; Compete Complaint at 1, 3, 7; Credit Karma Complaint at 1–2, 
6; Complaint at 2–3, CVS Caremark Corp., No. C-4259 (F.T.C. June 23, 2009), 
[hereinafter CVS Complaint], 
http://www.ftc.gov/sites/default/files/documents/cases/2009/06/090623cvscmpt.pdf, 
archived at http://perma.cc/P3V3-JUQJ; Dave & Buster’s Complaint at 2; DSW 
Complaint at 1, 3; EPN Complaint at 1, 3; Fandango Complaint at 2, 4–5; GeneLink and 
foru
TM
 Complaint at 12, 14; Genica Complaint at 2–3; Guess Complaint at 1–2; 
Complaint at 2, 4, GMR Transcription Services, Inc., No. 122-3095 (F.T.C. Jan. 31, 
2014) [hereinafter GMR Transcription Services Complaint], 
http://www.ftc.gov/system/files/documents/cases/140203gmrcmpt.pdf, archived at 
http://perma.cc/9R58-EYJF; Guidance Software Complaint at 1; LabMD Complaint at 2; 
Complaint at 1, Lookout Services, Inc., No. C-4326, (F.T.C. June 15, 2011), [hereinafter 
Lookout Services Complaint], 
http://www.ftc.gov/sites/default/files/documents/cases/2011/06/110615lookoutcmpt.pdf, 
archived at http://perma.cc/5SF5-EC6N; Life is Good Complaint, at 2; LifeLock 
Complaint at 4–5; Petco Complaint at 1, 4; Complaint at 1–3, Rite Aid Corp., No. C-4308 
(F.T.C. Nov. 22, 2010), [hereinafter Rite Aid Complaint], 
http://www.ftc.gov/sites/default/files/documents/cases/2010/11/101122riteaidcmpt.pdf, 
archived at http://perma.cc/FB2Q-V6TJ; TJX Complaint at 2–3; Upromise Complaint at 
3, 6. 
 
107
 See Accretive Health Complaint at 2. 
 
108
 See EPN Complaint at 1. 
 
109
 See LabMD Complaint at 2.   
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prescribing physician names, addresses, and telephone numbers, health 
insurer names, and insurance account and policy numbers;
110
 genetic 
information;
111
 medical histories, health care providers’ examination 
notes, medications, and psychiatric notes;
112
 and medical health history 
profiles, blood type results, infectious disease marker results, newborn 
children’s names, genders, birth dates and times, birth weights, delivery 
types, and adoption types (open, closed, or surrogate).
113
  These categories 
of health-related personal information are comparable to HIPAA-protected 
PHI.  Other FTC enforcement actions under Section 5 have focused on 
safeguards for nonpublic consumer identification information from credit 
reporting agencies
114
 and credit report information generally;
115
 
information similar to that protected under FACTA. 
 
[39] Several FTC Section 5 enforcement proceedings under a deception 
theory have focused on safeguards for the security of consumers’ online 
activity information, such as data on consumers’ user names, passwords, 
search terms, websites visited, links followed, ads viewed, and shopping 
cart actions;
116
 nonpublic social network profile information;
117
 and 
nonpublic smart phone data, including text message content, GPS location 
                                                             
110
 See CVS Complaint at 2; see also Rite Aid Complaint at 1–2. 
 
111
 See GeneLink and foru
TM
 Complaint at 12.  
 
112
 See, e.g., GMR Transcription Services Complaint at 2. 
 
113
 See, e.g., Cbr Systems Complaint at 1–2. 
 
114
 See, e.g., Reed Elsevier Complaint at 2. 
 
115
 See, e.g., Credit Karma Complaint at 1–2. 
 
116
 See, e.g., Compete Complaint at 3; see also Upromise Complaint at 2. 
 
117
 See, e.g., Complaint at 2–3, Facebook, Inc., No. C-4365, (F.T.C. Aug. 10, 2012) 
[hereinafter Facebook Complaint], 
http://www.ftc.gov/sites/default/files/documents/cases/2012/08/120810facebookcmpt.pdf
, archived at http://perma.cc/47BF-9VV3; see also Myspace Complaint at 1–2; Twitter 
Complaint at 1–2. 
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data, web browsing and media viewing history, phone numbers of users 
and contacts, and numeric keys pressed.
118
  Most of this information is 
well beyond what traditionally comprises PII under state statutes, but in 
each of the above matters the FTC alleged that the subject company 
engaged in deceptive conduct by misrepresenting that the information 
would remain private or be safeguarded.
119
   
 
[40] The FTC, using Section 5 deceptive theory, has also pursued data 
security enforcement actions against retailers for failure to safeguard 
personal information beyond traditional PII, including shipping addresses, 
order numbers, and information on all previously purchased products, in 
alleged violation of the companies’ privacy policies.120   
 
[41] In its enforcement action against Eli Lily, the FTC’s Section 5 
deception claim simply focused on the names and e-mail addresses 
contained within a single group e-mail sent to 669 persons.
121
  The 
additional factors were that the recipients were subscribers to a “MEDI-
messenger” service of the manufacturer of Prozac, and the disclosure of 
their identities was alleged to violate the applicable privacy policy.
122
 
 
[42] In the matter of TRENDnet, Inc., an FTC information security 
enforcement matter based on both deception and unfairness under Section 
5, the protected information was live video feed images from Internet 
Protocol (IP) cameras used by TRENDnet’s customers for business and 
home monitoring.
123
  Notably, live video feeds are not specified as 
                                                             
118
 See, e.g., HTC America Complaint at 5. 
 
119
 See text accompanying supra notes 116–18. 
 
120
 See, e.g., MTS and Tower Direct Complaint at 2; see also ValueClick Complaint at 9–
10. 
 
121
 See Eli Lily Complaint at 3. 
 
122
 See id. 
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protected information under any identified federal or state data security 
statute or regulation.  The FTC’s claim under the deceptive prong of 
Section 5 was based on alleged misrepresentations in TRENDnet’s 
marketing and sales materials.
124
  In support of its unfairness allegations, 
the FTC stated: 
 
The exposure of sensitive information through respondent’s 
IP cameras increases the likelihood that consumers or their 
property will be targeted for theft or other criminal activity, 
increases the likelihood that consumers’ personal activities 
and conversations or those of their family members, 
including young children, will be observed and recorded by 
strangers over the Internet.  This risk impairs consumers’ 
peaceful enjoyment of their homes, increases consumers’ 
susceptibility to physical tracking or stalking, and reduces 
customers’ ability to control the dissemination of personal 
or proprietary information (e.g., intimate video and audio 
feeds or images and conversations from business 
properties).  Consumers had little, if any, reason to know 
that their information was at risk, particularly those 
consumers who maintained login credentials for their 
cameras or who were merely unwitting third parties present 
in locations under surveillance by the cameras.
125
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                                                                                                                       
123
 See Complaint at 5, TRENDnet, Inc., No. C-4426, (F.T.C. Feb. 7, 2014) [hereinafter 
TRENDnet Complaint], 
http://www.ftc.gov/system/files/documents/cases/140207trendnetcmpt.pdf, archived at 
http://perma.cc/QQG3-Q9X7. 
 
124
 See id. at 3–4. 
 
125
 Id. at 6. 
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2.  Information Protected Due to Third-Party 
Obligations  
 
[43] Organizations may have contractual obligations to safeguard 
certain types of information.  For example, organizations that are service 
providers or suppliers to other entities may be required by contract to have 
certain safeguards in place for protected information.
126
  And companies 
that store, process, or transmit payment card information may by contract 
be subject to the Payment Card Industry (PCI) Data Security Standard, 
which sets forth extensive, detailed security safeguards and controls for 
cardholder data.
127
  Organizations should therefore consider their 
contractual obligations when identifying the types of information to which 
they will apply security safeguards. 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                             
126
 See text accompanying infra notes 282–83, 285, 293–99. 
 
127
 See PCI SEC. STANDARDS COUNCIL, PAYMENT CARD INDUSTRY (PCI) DATA SECURITY 
STANDARD: REQUIREMENTS AND SECURITY ASSESSMENT PROCEDURES 5 (Version 2.0 ed. 
2010) [hereinafter PCI 2.0], available at 
https://www.pcisecuritystandards.org/documents/pci_dss_v2.pdf, archived at 
http://perma.cc/PDY8-XG3G.  The PCI Data Security Standard provides technical and 
operational requirements to protect cardholder data, and it “applies to all entities involved 
in payment card processing—including merchants, processors, acquirers, issuers, and 
service providers, as well as all other entities that store, process or transmit cardholder 
data.”  Id. at 5.  While Version 2.0 of PCI DSS remains active until December 31, 2014, 
Version 3.0 was issued in November 2013 by the PCI Security Standards Council to 
allow organizations time to adjust their practices for compliance with the revised 
requirements.  See PCI SEC. STANDARDS COUNCIL, PAYMENT CARD INDUSTRY (PCI) 
DATA SECURITY STANDARD AND PAYMENT APPLICATION DATA SECURITY STANDARD: 
VERSION 3.0 CHANGE HIGHLIGHTS, at 1 (2013) available at 
https://www.pcisecuritystandards.org/documents/DSS_and_PA-
DSS_Change_Highlights.pdf, archived at http://perma.cc/A5MT-L62C.  
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3.  Information Protected Consistent with the 
Organization’s Risk Strategy  
 
[44] There may be other categories of information for which the 
organization will choose to apply safeguards to preserve confidentiality, 
such as nonpublic, strategic business information.  As noted above, if the 
organization wants to enjoy trade secret protection for certain confidential 
business information it must take reasonable measures to maintain the 
information’s secrecy.128  Regardless of whether legally protectable trade 
secret status exists, most organizations will want to maintain an 
appropriate level of confidentiality regarding information they have 
assembled for a business or operational advantage. 
 
[45] If an organization voluntarily chooses to participate in the U.S.-EU 
Safe Harbor Program, it will be obligated to abide by the Safe Harbor 
Privacy Principles, including the Security Principle, under which the 
organization must take reasonable precautions to protect personal 
information.
129
  Such organizations should therefore identify personal data 
protected under the Safe Harbor and other data protection laws of 
European Union countries involved in this directive.
130
 
 
[46] ISO 27002 highlights the importance of identifying information 
that must be safeguarded in compliance with legal and contractual 
requirements.
131
  Such controls include identification of applicable 
legislation and contractual requirements regarding safeguards generally, 
                                                             
128
 See 18 U.S.C. § 1839(3)(a) (2012) (“the owner therefore has taken reasonable 
measures to keep such information secret”); see also UNIF. TRADE SECRETS ACT § 
1(4)(ii) (1985) (“is the subject of efforts that are reasonable under the circumstances to 
maintain its secrecy”). 
 
129
 See U.S.-EU Safe Harbor Overview, EXPORT, 
http://www.export.gov/safeharbor/eu/eg_main_018476.asp (last visited Oct. 1, 2014), 
archived at http://perma.cc/LVY2-GRKG.  
 
130
 See id. 
 
131
 See ISO 27002, supra note 5, at § 18.1.1 (2013). 
Richmond Journal of Law & Technology                              Volume XXI, Issue 1 
 
44 
 
intellectual property rights, protection of records, privacy and protection 
of personally identifiable information, and cryptographic controls.
132
  ISO 
27002 also provides guidance on controls for information classification, 
including controls for information classification, labeling of information, 
and handling of assets.
133
    
 
[47] The NIST Cybersecurity Framework, under its Identify function, 
provides a range of activities in the category of Asset Management, under 
which “[t]he data . . . that enable the organization to achieve business 
purposes are identified and managed consistent with their relative 
importance to business objectives and the organization’s risk strategy.”134  
These activities include identifying data and the related physical devices, 
systems, software platforms, and applications, mapping data flows, and 
prioritizing based on classification, criticality, and business value.
135
 
 
B.   Assess 
 
An Organization Should Assess Anticipated Threats, 
Vulnerabilities, and Risks to the Security of Protected 
Information  
 
[48] Once it determines the types of information to be safeguarded, an 
organization should then assess anticipated threats, vulnerabilities, and 
risks to the security of that information.  Such an assessment is crucial to 
                                                             
132
 See id. at §18.1. 
 
133
 See id. at § 8.2. 
 
134
 Nat'l Inst. Of Standards & Tech., Framework for Improving Critical Infrastructure 
Cybersecurity 20 (Version 1.0, 2014) [hereinafter Cybersecurity Framework] available at 
http://www.nist.gov/cyberframework/upload/cybersecurity-framework-021214.pdf, 
archived at http://perma.cc/U23X-MV6S.   
 
135
 See id.  
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help the organization understand its information security environment and 
to identify its priorities in developing an information security program.   
 
[49] Various laws mandate assessments of information security threats, 
vulnerabilities, and risks.  HIPAA covered entities and business associates 
must “[c]onduct an accurate and thorough assessment of the potential risks 
and vulnerabilities to the confidentiality, integrity, and availability of 
electronic protected health information held by the covered entity or 
business associate.” 136   The interagency guidelines establishing 
information security standards under Gramm-Leach-Bliley require risk 
assessment as well.  Banks must: 
 
1. Identify reasonably foreseeable internal and external threats 
that could result in unauthorized disclosure, misuse, 
alteration, or destruction of customer information or 
customer information systems. 
 
2. Assess the likelihood and potential damage of these threats, 
taking into consideration the sensitivity of customer 
information. 
 
3. Assess the sufficiency of policies, procedures, customer 
information systems, and other arrangements in place to 
control risks.
137
   
 
[50] The FTC Safeguards Rule under Gramm-Leach-Bliley similarly 
requires a risk assessment to “[i]dentify reasonably foreseeable internal 
and external risks to the security, confidentiality, and integrity of customer 
information that could result in the unauthorized disclosure, misuse, 
                                                             
136
 45 C.F.R. § 164.308(a)(1)(ii)(A) (2013). 
 
137
 See, e.g., 12 C.F.R. pt. 30, app. B(III)(B) (2014) (OCC); 12 C.F.R. pt. 170, app. 
B(III)(B) (2014) (OCC); 12 C.F.R. pt. 208, app. D-2(III)(B) (2014) (Federal Reserve 
Board); 12 C.F.R. pt. 225, app. F(III)(B) (2014) (Federal Reserve Board); 12 C.F.R. pt. 
364, app. B(III)(B) (2014) (FDIC); see also 12 C.F.R. pt. 748, app. A(III)(B) (2014) 
(NCUA). 
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alteration, destruction or other compromise of such information, and 
assess the sufficiency of any safeguards in place to control these risks.”138  
The FTC Safeguards Rule further provides:  
 
At a minimum, such a risk assessment should include 
consideration of risks in each relevant area of your 
operations, including: (1) Employee training and 
management; (2) Information systems, including network 
and software design, as well as information processing, 
storage, transmission and disposal; and (3) Detecting, 
preventing and responding to attacks, intrusions, or other 
systems failures.
139
 
 
[51] In its PII Protection Standards, Massachusetts requires persons that 
own or license PII of Massachusetts’ residents to have a comprehensive 
information security program that includes “[i]dentifying and assessing 
reasonably foreseeable internal and external risks to the security, 
confidentiality, and/or integrity of any electronic, paper or other records 
containing personal information . . . .” 140   Under the Massachusetts 
Standards, such an assessment must be focused on “evaluating and 
improving, where necessary, the effectiveness of the current safeguards 
for limiting such risks, including but not limited to: (1) ongoing employee 
(including temporary and contract employee) training; (2) employee 
compliance with policies and procedures; and (3) means for detecting and 
preventing security system failures.” 141   Oregon’s statute requiring 
safeguards for PII sets forth elements of a security program that shall be 
deemed compliant, including identifying “reasonably foreseeable internal 
                                                             
138
 16 C.F.R. § 314.4(b) (2014). 
 
139
 Id. 
 
140
 201 MASS. CODE REGS. 17.03(2)(b) (2014). 
 
141
 Id. 
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and external risks” and assessing “the sufficiency of safeguards in place to 
control the identified risks.”142 
 
[52] FTC enforcement actions under the authority of Gramm-Leach-
Bliley commonly allege a failure to “identify reasonably foreseeable 
internal and external risks to customer information.”143  The FTC has also 
taken the position in enforcement actions under the authority of Section 5 
of the FTC Act that the failure to “perform assessments to identify 
reasonably foreseeable risks to the security, integrity, and confidentiality 
of consumers’ personal information” may constitute an unfair or deceptive 
trade practice.
144
  Additionally, FTC consent orders routinely require that 
                                                             
142
 OR. REV. STAT. ANN. § 646A.622(2)(d)(A)(ii)(iii) (West 2011). 
 
143
 See, e.g., Complaint at 2–3, United States v. American United Mortg. Co., No. 07C-
7064 (N.D. Ill. Dec. 17, 2007) [hereinafter American United Complaint], 
http://www.ftc.gov/sites/default/files/documents/cases/2007/12/071217americanunitedmr
tgcmplt.pdf, archived at http://perma.cc/UNS3-W6Z9; see also Complaint at 2, Goal 
Financial, LLC, No. C-4216 (F.T.C. Apr. 15, 2008) [hereinafter Goal Financial 
Complaint], 
http://www.ftc.gov/sites/default/files/documents/cases/2008/04/080415complaint_0.pdf, 
archived at http://perma.cc/4P5C-TC4X; Complaint at 3, James B. Nutter & Co., No. C-
4258 (F.T.C. May 5, 2009) [hereinafter James B. Nutter & Co. Complaint], 
http://www.ftc.gov/sites/default/files/documents/cases/2009/06/090616nuttercmpt.pdf, 
archived at http://perma.cc/DQ9T-J2HJ; Nations Title Agency Complaint at 3; 
Complaint at 2, Nationwide Mortg. Grp., Inc., No. 9319 (F.T.C. Nov. 9, 2004) 
[hereinafter Nationwide Complaint], 
http://www.ftc.gov/sites/default/files/documents/cases/2004/11/041116cmp0423104.pdf, 
archived at http://perma.cc/EG9Q-WDC5; Complaint at 4, Premier Capital Lending, Inc., 
No. C-4241 (F.T.C. Nov. 6, 2008) [hereinafter Premier Capital Lending Complaint], 
http://www.ftc.gov/sites/default/files/documents/cases/2008/11/081106pclcmpt.pdf, 
archived at http://perma.cc/754L-P4F5; Complaint at 4, SettlementOne Credit Corp., No. 
C-4330 (F.T.C. Aug. 17, 2011) [hereinafter SettlementOne Credit Complaint], 
http://www.ftc.gov/sites/default/files/documents/cases/2011/08/110819settlementonecmp
t.pdf, archived at http://perma.cc/D9HG-ZC2L; and Complaint at 2, Sunbelt Lending 
Servs., Inc., No. C-4129 (F.T.C. Nov. 16, 2004) [hereinafter Sunbelt Lending 
Complaint], 
http://www.ftc.gov/sites/default/files/documents/cases/2004/11/041116cmp0423153.pdf, 
archived at http://perma.cc/LMC6-SPKR. 
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the respondent company “[identify] material internal and external risks to 
the security, confidentiality and integrity of personal information that 
could result in the unauthorized disclosure, misuse, loss, alteration, 
destruction, or other compromise of such information, and the assessment 
of the sufficiency of any safeguards in place to control the risks.”145 
 
[53] ISO 27002 does not provide methodologies for assessment of 
security risks, as it is instead a compendium of controls to be adopted and 
applied to address identified risks.
146
  Risk assessment is more directly 
addressed in a companion standard, ISO 27005, which deals with 
information security risk management.
147
 
 
[54] The NIST Cybersecurity Framework provides a useful structure for 
risk assessment and development of a risk management strategy.  Through 
risk assessment, “[t]he organization understands the cybersecurity risk to 
organizational operations (including mission, functions, image, or 
reputation), organizational assets, and individuals.”148  In risk assessment:  
 
                                                                                                                                                       
144
 See GeneLink and foru
TM
 Complaint at 13; see also LabMD Complaint at 3 
(respondent “did not use readily available measures to identify commonly known or 
reasonably foreseeable security risks and vulnerabilities of its networks.”). 
 
145
 See Accretive Health Order at 3.  See generally, e.g., RockYou Order at 5, 8 (example 
of consent orders under COPPA); ACRAnet Order at 2–3 (example of consent orders 
under the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Security Rule); Cbr Systems Order at 3 (example of 
consent orders under FTC Act §5).   
 
146
 See ISO 27002, supra note 5, at § 0.2(a) (One means to identify an organization’s 
security requirements is “the assessment of risks to the organization, taking into account 
the organization’s overall business strategy and objectives.  Through a risk assessment, 
threats to assets are identified, vulnerability to and likelihood of occurrence is evaluated 
and potential impact is estimated”).   
 
147
 See INT’L ORG. FOR STANDARDIZATION, ISO 27005, INFORMATION TECHNOLOGY—
SECURITY TECHNIQUES—INFORMATION SECURITY RISK MANAGEMENT at 6–9, (2011) 
[hereinafter ISO 27005]. 
 
148
 Cybersecurity Framework, supra note 134, at 22. 
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Asset vulnerabilities are identified and documented; . . . 
[t]hreat and vulnerability information is received from 
information sharing forums and sources; . . . [t]hreats, both 
internal and external, are identified and documented; . . . 
[p]otential business impacts and likelihoods are identified; . 
. . [t]hreats, vulnerabilities, likelihoods, and impacts are 
used to determine risk; [and] . . . [r]isk responses are 
identified and prioritized.
149
   
 
Then, through development of a risk management strategy, “[t]he 
organization’s priorities, constraints, risk tolerances, and assumptions are 
established and used to support operational risk decisions.” 150   In 
developing a risk management strategy, “[r]isk management processes are 
established, managed, and agreed to by organizational stakeholders; . . . 
[o]rganizational risk tolerance is determined and clearly expressed; [and] . 
. . [t]he organization’s determination of risk tolerance is informed by its 
role in critical infrastructure and sector specific risk analysis.”151   
 
C.   Safeguard 
 
An Organization Should Establish and Maintain 
Appropriate Policies and Administrative, Physical, and 
Technical Controls to Address the Identified Threats, 
Vulnerabilities, and Risks to the Security of Protected 
Information 
 
[55] Informed by its risk assessment regarding the types of information 
to be safeguarded, an organization should establish and maintain 
appropriate policies and controls to address the identified threats, 
                                                             
149
 Id. at 22–23. 
 
150
 Id. at 23. 
 
151
 Id. 
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vulnerabilities, and risks to the security of such information.
152
  The policy 
and controls selected should be consistent with applicable legal 
requirements, the organization’s information safeguards obligations to 
third-parties, and its strategic approach to risk management.  As discussed 
below, the program should also address training and awareness for 
employees and others with access to protected information.  Moreover, the 
effectiveness of the selected safeguards should be tested or otherwise 
evaluated, to provide reasonable assurance that the organization’s 
objectives for information security will be met.  
 
1.  Information Security Policy 
 
[56] An organization should have a policy or policies that address what 
categories of information will be subject to security safeguards, how such 
safeguarding will be accomplished, and who or what functions within the 
organization have what responsibilities in that regard.  Legal requirements 
for information security commonly require a written information security 
program to address identified risks.
153
  Several such laws require a 
                                                             
152
 FTC Consent Orders commonly require “[t]he design and implementation of 
reasonable safeguards to control the risks identified through risk assessment . . . .”  See 
Accretive Health Order at 3; see also supra note 145 and accompanying text.  
 
153
 See, e.g., 12 C.F.R. pt. 30, app. B(II)(A) (2014) (“[e]ach bank shall implement a 
comprehensive written information security program that includes administrative, 
technical, and physical safeguards . . . .”) (Interagency Guidelines Establishing 
Information Security Standards under Gramm-Leach-Bliley); 16 C.F.R. § 314.3(a) (2014) 
(“[y]ou shall develop, implement, and maintain a comprehensive information security 
program that is written in one or more readily accessible parts . . . .”) (FTC Safeguards 
Rule under Gramm-Leach-Bliley); 45 C.F.R. § 164.308(a)(1)(i) (2013) (“[i]mplement 
policies and procedures to prevent, detect, contain, and correct security violations.”), 45 
C.F.R. § 164.316(a) (2013) (“[i]mplement reasonable and appropriate policies and 
procedures to comply with the standards, implementation specifications, or other 
requirements of this subpart . . . .”); 45 C.F.R. § 164.316(b)(1) (2013) (“[m]aintain the 
policies and procedures implemented to comply with this subpart in written (which may 
be electronic) form . . . .”) (HIPAA Security Rule); 201 MASS. CODE REGS. 17.03(1) 
(2013) (“develop, implement, and maintain a comprehensive information security 
program that is written in one or more readily accessible parts and contains 
administrative, technical, and physical safeguards . . . .”) (Massachusetts PII Protection 
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designation of who is responsible for implementing and maintaining the 
program.
154
 
  
[57] In its enforcement proceedings under Gramm-Leach-Bliley and 
FACTA, the FTC has frequently focused on the respondent’s failure to 
develop a comprehensive written information security program.
155
  The 
FTC has also taken the position in enforcement proceedings under Section 
5 of the FTC Act that the failure to “implement reasonable policies and 
procedures to protect the security of consumers’ personal information 
                                                                                                                                                       
Standards); OR. REV. STAT. ANN. § 646A.622(2)(d) (West 2011) (“[a] person that 
implements an information security program” including specified features will be deemed 
in compliance) (Oregon PII Safeguards statute). 
 
154
 The interagency guidelines establishing information security standards under Gramm-
Leach-Bliley require that the board of directors or an appropriate board committee must 
approve the written information security program and “[o]versee the development, 
implementation, and maintenance of the bank’s information security program, including 
assigning specific responsibility for its implementation and reviewing reports from 
management.”  See, e.g., 12 C.F.R. pt. 30, app. B(III)(A) (2014).  Annual reporting to the 
board or an appropriate board committee on compliance and the overall status of the 
information security program is also required.  See, e.g., 12 C.F.R. pt. 30, app. B(III)(F).   
 
Organizations subject to the FTC Safeguards Rule must “[d]esginate an employee or 
employees to coordinate [the] information security program.”  See, e.g., 16 C.F.R. § 
314.4(a) (2014).  The HIPAA Security Rule requires covered entities and business 
associates to “[i]dentify the security official who is responsible for the development and 
implementation of the policies and procedures required by this subpart . . . .”  45 C.F.R. § 
164.308(a)(2) (2014).   
 
Organizations subject to the Massachusetts PII Protection Standards must “[designate] 
one or more employees to maintain the comprehensive information security program . . . 
.”  201 MASS. CODE REGS. 17.03(2)(a).  Organizations are deemed in compliance with 
the Oregon PII Safeguards Statute if, among other matters, they “[designate] one or more 
employees to coordinate the security program . . . .”  OR. REV. STAT. ANN. § 
646A.622(2)(d)(i) (West 2011). 
 
155
 See, e.g., American United Complaint at 3, 6; Goal Financial Complaint at 2–3; James 
B. Nutter & Co. Complaint at 2–3; Nations Title Agency Complaint at 3; Nationwide 
Complaint at 2–3; SettlementOne Credit Complaint at 4; and Sunbelt Lending Complaint 
at 2–3. 
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collected and maintained by respondents” is an unfair and deceptive trade 
practice,
156
 and that the failure to “develop, implement, or maintain a 
comprehensive information security program to protect consumers’ 
personal information” can also be an unfair trade practice.157   
  
[58] As discussed previously, FTC Consent Orders under the authority 
of Gramm-Leach-Bliley, COPPA, and Section 5 of the FTC Act 
commonly require the respondent to establish a written, comprehensive 
information security program.
158
  Such orders commonly also require 
“[t]he designation of an employee or employees to coordinate and be 
accountable for the information security program . . . .”159 
 
[59] ISO 27002 provides that “[a] set of policies for information 
security should be defined, approved by management, published and 
communicated to employees and relevant external parties.” 160   “All 
information security responsibilities should be defined and allocated,”161 
and “[o]perating procedures should be documented and made available to 
all users who need them.”162 
 
[60] The NIST Cybersecurity Framework addresses security policies in 
its Governance category within the Identify function, in which an 
“[o]rganizational information security policy is established; [i]nformation 
security roles [and] responsibilities are coordinated and aligned with 
internal roles and external partners; [l]egal and regulatory requirements 
                                                             
156
 See GeneLink and foru
TM
 Complaint at 13–14. 
 
157
 See, e.g., LabMD Complaint at 3. 
 
158
 See supra notes 145 and accompanying text. 
 
159
 E.g., Accretive Health Order at 3. 
 
160
 See ISO 27002, supra note 5, at § 5.1.1. 
 
161
See id. at § 6.1.1. 
 
162
 See id. at § 12.1.1.  
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regarding cybersecurity, including privacy and civil liberties obligations, 
are understood and managed; [and] . . . [g]overnance and risk management 
processes address cybersecurity risks.”163 
 
2.  Controls 
 
[61] An organization may appropriately establish a variety of 
administrative, physical, and technical controls to address its information 
security risks.  As discussed above, different organizations in different 
industries and circumstances will have different security risks, and so the 
selection of appropriate controls will vary between organizations.
164
  
Below are eleven categories of security controls commonly referenced in 
information safeguards legal requirements and voluntary security 
standards, including controls for system access, physical access, 
encryption, transmission security, mobile device and portable media 
security, system change management, employee management, 
environmental risk, monitoring and detection, retention, and disposal. 
 
a.  System Access Controls 
 
[62] System access controls are designed to help ensure that only 
authorized individuals have access to systems containing protected 
                                                             
163
 Cybersecurity Framework, supra note 134, at 21–22. 
 
164
 The 2014 Verizon Data Security Report recommends safeguards priorities for each of 
its nine security incident patterns, which differ in frequency between industries.  See 
2014 Verizon Data Security Report, supra note 57 and accompanying text.  For example, 
priority security controls for Point-of-Sale Attacks include remote access restrictions, 
strong password enforcement, limiting use of POS systems to their intended purpose, and 
effective anti-virus software.  See id. at 19.  In contrast, priority security controls for 
Physical Theft and Loss include device encryption, avoiding leaving devices unattended, 
regular backup, lock-down of equipment located in offices, and (believe it or not) the use 
of unappealing devices.  See id. at 28.    
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information.  These controls also commonly feature mechanisms to 
authenticate the identity of the individual seeking access.
165
 
 
[63] System access controls are commonly required under legal 
requirements for information security programs,
166
 and in its data security 
enforcement actions, the FTC frequently cites shortcomings in system 
access controls related to passwords or other user credentials, including: 
failure to use strong passwords;
167
 failure to require periodic change of 
passwords or to prohibit use of the same password across multiple 
                                                             
165
 See FTC Business Guidance, supra note 63, at 9, 12–15 (addressing system access 
controls under principle 3 (Lock It) “protect the information that you keep,” under 
Password Management, Firewalls, and Wireless and Remote Access).  
 
166
 See, e.g., 12 C.F.R. pt. 30, app. B(III)(C)(1)(a) (2014) (Interagency Guidelines 
Establishing Information Security Standards under Gramm-Leach-Bliley); 16 C.F.R. § 
314.4(b)–(c) (2014) (requirement to implement information safeguards to control 
identified risks, including the “unauthorized disclosure, misuse, alteration, destruction or 
other compromise” of protected information and the FTC Safeguards Rule under Gramm-
Leach-Bliley); 45 C.F.R. § 164.308(a)(4)(i) (2013) (the HIPAA Security Rule requires 
“policies and procedures for authorizing access to electronic protected health information 
. . .”); 45 C.F.R. § 164.312(d) (2013) (“procedures to verify that a person or entity 
seeking access to electronic protected health information is the one claimed”); 45 C.F.R. 
§ 164.312(a)(1)–(2)(ii) (2013) (The HIPAA Security Rule also requires “technical 
policies and procedures for electronic information systems that maintain electronic 
protected health information to allow access only to those persons or software programs 
that have been granted access rights . . . .” including unique user identification and 
emergency access procedures); 45 C.F.R. § 164.308(a)(4)(ii)(B)–(C) (2013) (Addressable 
implementation specifications include access authorization and access establishment and 
modification); 45 C.F.R. § 164.308(a)(5)(ii)(C) (2013) (“[l]og-in monitoring”); 45 C.F.R. 
§ 164.308(a)(5)(ii)(D) (“[p]assword management”); 45 C.F.R. § 164.312(a)(2)(iii) (2013) 
(“[a]utomatic logoff”); 45 C.F.R. § 164.312(a)(2)(iv) (2013) (“encryption”); see also 201 
MASS. CODE REGS. 17.04(1),(2) (secure user authentication protocols and secure access 
control measures, Massachusetts PII Protection Standards); OR. REV. STAT. ANN. § 
646A.622(2)(d)(C)(iii) (West 2011) (safeguards to protect against unauthorized access to 
personal information, Massachusetts PII Protection Statute).  
 
167
 See, e.g., CardSystems Solutions Complaint at 2; see also Wyndham Worldwide 
Complaint at 11–12; LifeLock Complaint at 10; Lookout Services Complaint at 2; Reed 
Elsevier Complaint at 3; TJX Complaint at 2; Twitter Complaint at 4. 
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applications and programs;
168
 failure to suspend users after a reasonable 
number of unsuccessful login attempts;
169
 and the practice of storing 
passwords or other network user credentials in clear readable text.
170
  In at 
least two enforcement matters, the FTC has focused on a security flaw of 
allowing commonly known or used default user IDs and passwords, or the 
sharing of user credentials among a third-party’s multiple users, thereby 
reducing the likelihood of detecting unauthorized access.
171
  In other 
enforcement matters, the FTC has focused on additional shortcomings in 
system access safeguards, including the failure to restrict access between 
and among systems with firewalls;
172
 the failure to use reasonable efforts 
to verify or authenticate the identity and qualifications of users, such as 
third-party subscribers, for accessing protected information;
173
 and the 
                                                             
168
 See, e.g., LabMD Complaint, at 3; see also LifeLock Complaint at 10; Lookout 
Services Complaint at 2; Reed Elsevier Complaint at 3; TJX Complaint at 2; Twitter 
Complaint at 4. 
 
169
 See, e.g., LifeLock Complaint at 10; see also Lookout Services Complaint at 2; Reed 
Elsevier Complaint at 3; Twitter Complaint at 4. 
 
170
 See, e.g., Guidance Software Complaint at 2; see also Reed Elsevier Complaint at 3; 
Twitter Complaint at 4. 
 
171
 See, e.g., BJ’s Wholesale Club Complaint at 2; see also Reed Elsevier Complaint at 3. 
 
172
 See, e.g., Dave & Buster’s Complaint at 2; see also Wyndham Worldwide Complaint 
at 10. 
 
173
 See, e.g., Complaint at 3, Equifax Info. Servs., LLC, No. C-4387 (F.T.C. Mar. 5, 
2013) [hereinafter Equifax Complaint] 
http://www.ftc.gov/sites/default/files/documents/cases/2012/10/121010equifaxcmpt.pdf, 
archived at http://perma.cc/4BWH-LKEM; see also Complaint at 9, United States v. 
ChoicePoint, Inc., No. 1:06-CV-0198-GET (N.D. Ga. Jan. 30, 2006) [hereinafter 
ChoicePoint Complaint], 
http://www.ftc.gov/sites/default/files/documents/cases/2006/01/0523069complaint.pdf, 
archived at http://perma.cc/43MH-F7Y4; Complaint at 8, United States v. Rental 
Research Servs., Inc., No. 072-3228 (D. Minn. Mar. 5, 2009) [hereinafter Rental 
Research Complaint], 
http://www.ftc.gov/sites/default/files/documents/cases/2009/03/090305rrscmpt.pdf, 
archived at http://perma.cc/UU8Y-VRSK;  
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failure in general to restrict access to those individuals with a valid need 
for the protected information.
174
    
  
[64] System access control failures were a prominent feature of the $4.8 
million settlements obtained by HHS in enforcement proceedings against 
New York and Presbyterian Hospital and Columbia University.  The HHS 
investigation determined that the hospital and the university failed to 
assess and monitor the connection of computer applications and systems 
linked to the hospital’s patient databases and failed to implement 
appropriate security measures and access procedures.
175
   
 
[65] ISO 27002 offers a wealth of guidance on controls for system 
access, including controls regarding business requirements of access 
control, user access management, user responsibilities, and system and 
application access.
176
   
                                                             
174
 See, e.g., Accretive Health Complaint at 2 (“[f]ailing to adequately restrict access to, 
or copying of, personal information based on an employee’s need for information” and 
“[f]ailing to ensure that employees removed information from their computers for which 
they no longer had a business need”); see also LifeLock Complaint at 10 (failure “to limit 
access to personal information stored on or in transit through its networks only to 
employees and vendors needing access to the information to perform their jobs”); 
GeneLink and foru
TM
 Complaint at 13 (creating unnecessary security risks by allowing 
service provider access to customers’ complete personal information, rather than limiting 
access to only those categories of customer information for which service provider had a 
business need). 
 
175
 See Press Release, U.S. Dep't of Health & Human Servs., Data Breach Results in $4.8 
Million HIPAA Settlements (May 7, 2014) available at 
http://www.hhs.gov/news/press/2014pres/05/20140507b.html, archived at 
http://perma.cc/2QGN-9JCG. 
 
176
 See ISO 27002, supra note 5, at § 9.1 (access control policy and network access); see 
also id. at § 9.2 (user registration, user access provisioning, management of privileged 
access rights, management of secret authentication information of users (e.g., passwords), 
review of user access rights, and removal or adjustment of access rights); id. at § 9.3 (use 
of secret authentication information (e.g., passwords); id. at § 9.4 (information access 
restriction, secure log-on procedures, password management systems, user of privileged 
utility programs, and access control to program source code).  
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[66] Through access control under the NIST Cybersecurity 
Framework’s Protect function, “[a]ccess to assets…is limited to 
authorized users, processes, or devices, and to authorized activities and 
transactions.” 177   Access control safeguards include “[i]dentities and 
credentials are managed for authorized devices and users; . . .[r]emote 
access is managed; . . . [a]ccess permissions are managed, incorporating 
the principles of least privilege and separation of duties; [and] . . . 
[n]etwork integrity is protected, incorporating network segregation where 
appropriate. ”178 
 
b.  Physical Access Controls 
 
[67] Physical access controls restrict access to physical locations, 
including computer facilities, workstations, and devices containing 
protected information, and are designed to permit access only to 
authorized individuals.
179
  Such physical controls are commonly 
referenced in information security legal requirements.
180
 
                                                             
177
 Cybersecurity Framework, supra note 134, at 23. 
 
178
 Id. at 23–24, 29 (“Access to systems and assets is controlled, incorporating the 
principle of least functionality”). 
 
179
 See FTC Business Guidance, supra note 63, at 8–9 (Physical Security under the “Lock 
It” Principle). 
 
180
 See, e.g., 12 C.F.R. Pt.30, app. B(III)(C)(1)(b) (2014) (Interagency Guidelines 
Establishing Information Security Standards under Gramm-Leach-Bliley); see also 16 
C.F.R. § 314.4(a) (2014) (FTC Safeguards Rule under Gramm-Leach-Bliley); 45 C.F.R. 
§ 164.308(a)(4)(i) (2013) (The HIPAA Security Rule requires “policies and procedures 
for authorizing access to electronic protected health information . . . .”); 45 C.F.R. § 
164.310(a)(1) (2013) (“policies and procedures to limit physical access to . . . electronic 
information systems and the facility or facilities in which they are housed, while ensuring 
that properly authorized access is allowed”);  45 C.F.R. § 164.310(b) (2013) (“policies 
and procedures that specify the proper functions to be performed, the manner in which 
those functions are to be performed, and the physical attributes of the surroundings of a 
specific workstation or class of workstation that can access electronic protected health 
information,”); 45 C.F.R. § 164.310(c) (2013) (“physical safeguards for all workstations 
Richmond Journal of Law & Technology                              Volume XXI, Issue 1 
 
58 
 
 
[68] On occasion, FTC enforcement actions have involved alleged 
lapses in physical facility safeguards, such as failure “to secure paper 
documents containing personal information that were received by 
facsimile in an open and easily accessible area.”181 
 
[69] ISO 27002 provides guidance on controls for facility and other 
physical access, including controls for physical security perimeters, 
physical entry controls, securing offices, rooms, and facilities, working in 
secure areas, and delivery and loading areas.
182
  ISO 27002 also provides 
controls for equipment security.
183
 
 
[70] The NIST Cybersecurity Framework addresses facility access in 
several subcategories of control activities, including “[p]hysical access to 
assets is managed and protected;” 184  and “[p]olicy and regulations 
regarding the physical operating environment for organizational assets are 
met.”185 
                                                                                                                                                       
that access electronic protected health information, to restrict access to authorized 
users.”); 45 C.F.R. § 164.310(a)(2) (2013) (Addressable implementation specifications 
include procedures for contingency operations, access of facility security plan, access 
control and validation procedures, and maintenance records related to physical security); 
see also 201 MASS CODE REGS.17.03(2)(e), (2)(g) (requiring “[r]easonable restrictions 
upon physical access to records containing personal information” and prevention of 
terminated employees from accessing records containing PII) (Massachusetts PII 
Protection Standards); OR. REV. STAT. ANN. § 646A.622(2)(d)(C)(iii)(West 2011) 
(safeguards to protect against unauthorized access to personal information) (Oregon PII 
Safeguards Statute). 
 
181
 LifeLock Complaint at10. 
 
182
 See ISO 27002, supra note 5, at § 11.1. 
 
183
 See id. at § 11.2 (equipment siting and protection, cabling security, equipment 
maintenance, removal of assets, unattended user equipment, and clear desk and clear 
screen policies). 
 
184
 Cybersecurity Framework, supra note 134, at 23. 
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c.  Encryption 
 
[71] Encryption of protected information is designed to control 
unauthorized access, either while the information is stored within the 
organization’s systems or in storage devices and media (“data at rest”), or 
while the information being transmitted over and between networks, 
including the Internet (“data in transit”).   
 
[72] Encryption controls are referenced in some affirmative legal 
requirements for information security programs.
186
  Effective encryption is 
generally also a safe harbor under laws requiring notification for breaches 
in the security of protected information.
187
 
 
[73] The FTC has pursued companies in at least five enforcement 
matters for failure to encrypt protected information, most commonly credit 
card data, while in transmission.
188
  In at least sixteen enforcement matters 
                                                                                                                                                       
185
 Id. at 27. 
 
186
 See, e.g., 12 C.F.R. pt. 30, app. B(III)(C)(1)(c) (2014) (Interagency Guidelines 
Establishing Information Security Standards under Gramm-Leach-Bliley); see also 45 
C.F.R. § 164.312(a)(2)(iv)(e)(2)(ii) (2013) (Under the HIPAA Security Rule, encryption 
is an addressable implementation specification regarding access control and for 
transmission security.).  In addition, the Massachusetts PII Protection Standards require:  
 
To the extent technically feasible, . . . [e]ncryption of all transmitted 
records and files containing personal information that will travel across 
public networks, and encryption of all data containing personal 
information to be transmitted wirelessly . . . [and] of all personal 
information stored on laptops or other portable devices. 
 
201 MASS. CODE REGS. 17.04(3), (5) (Massachusetts PII Protection Standards).   
 
187
 See supra text accompanying note 92. 
 
188
 See, e.g., BJ’s Wholesale Club Complaint at 2 (failure to encrypt purchase card data in 
transit); see also LifeLock Complaint at 9 (transmitting protected information over its 
corporate network and the Internet in clear readable text); Compete Complaint at 5 
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the FTC has pursued companies under Section 5 of the FTC Act for 
storing protected information; most commonly card holder data, in clear 
readable text.
189
  Most of these Section 5 enforcement actions for failure to 
encrypt data-at-rest were deception claims based on representations 
allegedly made by the company that protected information stored on the 
company’s systems would be encrypted or otherwise secure.190  However, 
in at least one enforcement matter the FTC has taken the position that 
storage of cardholder data in clear text, along with transmission of such 
cardholder data in clear text between in-store and corporate networks, is 
an unfair trade practice, without alleging any deceptive representation.
191
 
 
                                                                                                                                                       
(transmitting sensitive information, such as financial account numbers and security codes, 
from secure web pages in clear readable text over the Internet); TJX Complaint at 2 
(transmitting protected information between in-store and corporate networks in clear 
text); Upromise Complaint at 4 (transmitting purchase card information in clear readable 
text over the Internet).   
 
189
 See, e.g., BJ’s Wholesale Club Complaint at 2; see also ValueClick Complaint at 11; 
Wyndham Worldwide Complaint at 10; LifeLock Complaint at 9; Cbr Systems 
Complaint at 3; Ceridian Corp. Complaint at 2; DSW Complaint at 2; Genica Complaint 
at 2; Guess Complaint at 3; Guidance Software Complaint at 2; Life is Good Complaint 
at 2; Lookout Services Complaint at 3; Petco Complaint at 2–3; Complaint at 6, United 
States v. RockYou, Inc., No. 312-CV-01487-12 (F.T.C. Mar. 26, 2012) [hereinafter 
RockYou Complaint], 
http://www.ftc.gov/sites/default/files/documents/cases/2012/03/120327rockyoucmpt.pdf, 
archived at http://perma.cc/52VR-52ZJ; TJX Complaint at 2; Twitter Complaint at 4. 
 
190
 See, e.g., Guidance Software Complaint at 2 (“we also do everything in our power to 
protect user-information off-line . . . .”); see also LifeLock Complaint at 9 (“All stored 
personal data is electronically encrypted.”); ValueClick Complaint at 10 (“ValueClick 
also encrypts sensitive information such as passwords and financial data.”); Life is Good 
Complaint at 2 (“All information is kept in a secure file . . . .”); Petco Complaint at 2 
(“protecting your information is our number one priority, and your personal data is 
strictly shielded from unauthorized access.  Our ‘100% Safeguard Your Shopping 
Experience Guarantee’ means you never have to worry about the safety of your credit 
card information.”).  
 
191
 See, e.g., TJX Complaint at 2–3. 
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[74] ISO 27002 provides guidance on cryptographic controls, including 
development and implementation of a policy on the use of such controls 
for information protection, and key management controls.
192
 
 
[75] The NIST Cybersecurity Framework addresses Data Security 
under its Protect function, providing that “[d]ata-at-rest is protected,” 
“[d]ata-in-transit is protected,” and “[p]rotections against data leaks are 
implemented.”193 
 
d.  Transmission Security Controls 
 
[76] Various controls can be applied to help safeguard protected 
information in transmission over unsecured electronic communications 
networks, including the Internet.  Such controls are designed to protect the 
integrity of the transmitted information and to guard against unauthorized 
access, such as through encryption.   
 
[77] Some legal requirements for information safeguards explicitly 
address transmission security.
194
  The FTC has taken the position in 
various enforcement proceedings that the transmission of protected 
information, such as cardholder data, in clear readable text is an unfair and 
deceptive trade practice.
195
  ISO 27002 offers communication security 
                                                             
192
 See ISO 27002, supra note 5, at § 10.1. 
 
193
 See Cybersecurity Framework, supra note 134, at 25–26. 
 
194
 For example, the HIPAA Security Rule requires “technical security measures to guard 
against unauthorized access to electronic protected health information that is being 
transmitted over an electronic communications network.” 45 C.F.R. § 164.312(e)(1) 
(2013); see also 45 C.F.R. § 164.312(e)(2)(i)–(ii) (2013) (outlining addressable 
implementation specifications of integrity controls and encryption).   
 
195
 See, e.g., BJ’s Wholesale Club Complaint at 2; see also ValueClick Complaint at 11; 
Wyndham Worldwide Complaint at 10; LifeLock Complaint at 9; Cbr Systems 
Complaint at 3; Ceridian Corp. Complaint at 2; DSW Complaint at 2; Genica Complaint 
at 2; Guess Complaint at 3; Guidance Software Complaint at 2; Life is Good Complaint 
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controls regarding network security management and information 
transfers.
196
  The NIST Cybersecurity Framework also addresses 
transmission security with several subcategories of control activities, 
including “[d]ata-in-transit is protected;” “[p]rotections against data leaks 
are implemented;” and “[c]ommunications and control networks are 
protected.”197 
 
e.  Mobile Device & Portable Media Controls 
 
[78] Various safeguard controls can be applied to address security risks 
inherent to protected information stored in mobile devices, such as laptops 
and smartphones, and in portable storage media.
198
  Such controls may 
include inventorying and tracking of mobile devices and media, policies 
for proper use, access barriers to and encryption of mobile devices and 
media, and appropriate care in mobile device or media disposal and re-use. 
 
[79] Some legal requirements for information safeguards directly 
address controls for mobile devices and portable media.
199
  Mobile device 
                                                                                                                                                       
at 2; Lookout Services Complaint at 3; Petco Complaint at 2–3; RockYou Complaint at 6; 
TJX Complaint at 2; Twitter Complaint at 4. 
 
196
 See ISO 27002, supra note 5, at § 13.1 (network controls, security of network 
services, and segregation in networks); see also id. at § 13.2 (information transfer policies 
and procedures, agreements on information transfer, and electronic messaging). 
 
197
 Cybersecurity Framework, supra note 134, at 25–26, 29. 
 
198
 See FTC Business Guidance, supra note 63 at 13–14. 
 
199
 For example, the HIPAA Security Rule requires “policies and procedures that govern 
the receipt and removal of hardware and electronic media that contain electronic 
protected health information into and out of a facility, and the movement of these items 
within the facility,” 45 C.F.R. § 164.310(d)(1) (2013), “policies and procedures to 
address the final disposition of electronic protected health information, and/or the 
hardware or electronic media on which it is stored,” 45 C.F.R. § 164.310(d)(2)(i) (2013), 
and “procedures for removal of electronic protected health information from electronic 
media before the media are made available for re-use,” 45 C.F.R. § 164.310(d)(2)(ii) 
(2013).   
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and portable media security has also been addressed in FTC enforcement 
actions under Section 5 of the FTC Act.  In Accretive Health, a laptop 
stolen from an employee’s locked car contained over 600 files with 
sensitive personal and health information of 23,000 patients, including 
patient names, dates of birth, billing information, diagnostic information, 
and Social Security numbers.
200
  The FTC alleged that “[t]ransporting 
laptops containing personal information in a manner that made them 
vulnerable to theft or other misappropriation” constituted an unfair trade 
practice.
201
  In Cbr Systems, Inc., an employee’s backpack was stolen from 
a personal vehicle; the backpack containing four Cbr backup tapes, a Cbr 
laptop, and a Cbr external hard drive and USB drive.
202
  The unencrypted 
backup tapes contained protected personal and health information, and the 
unencrypted laptop and hard drive contained passwords and protocols for 
obtaining access to Cbr’s network.203  Similar to its position in Accretive 
Health, the FTC alleged that Cbr violated Section 5 by “transporting 
portable media containing protected information in a manner that made 
media vulnerable to theft or other misappropriation.”204  The FTC further 
pursued Cbr for “failing to take reasonable steps to render backup tapes or 
other portable media containing personal information or information that 
could be used to access personal information unusable, unreadable, or 
indecipherable in the event of unauthorized access . . . .”205 
                                                                                                                                                       
Addressable implementation specifications include maintaining a record of the movement 
of such hardware and media, and of the person responsible for it, and also data backup 
and storage.  See, e.g., 45 C.F.R. § 164.310(d)(2)(iii)(iv) (2013).  For laws requiring 
reasonable controls for disposal of protected information and media and devices 
containing it, see infra text accompanying notes 254–264.  
 
200
 See Accretive Health Complaint at 2. 
 
201
 See id. 
 
202
 See Cbr Systems Complaint at 3.  
 
203
See id.  
 
204
 Id. at 2–3. 
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[80] In several recent enforcement matters, HHS has reached settlement 
agreements with HIPAA covered entities for failures to adequately secure 
ePHI in mobile devices and portable media.  Adult & Pediatric 
Dermatology agreed to pay $150,000 for the disclosure of the ePHI of 
2,200 individuals due to inadequate safeguards for a stolen, unencrypted 
thumb drive.
206
  QCA Health Plan, Inc., reached a $250,000 resolution 
agreement to resolve an investigation of its failure to implement physical 
safeguards for an unencrypted laptop that contained ePHI of 148 
individuals, and which was stolen out of a workforce member’s car.207  
HHS has also obtained a $1.725 million settlement with Concentra Health 
Services, arising out of the theft of an unencrypted laptop from a 
Concentra facility, due to its failure to adequately inventory and assess 
encryption for its laptops, and its failure to implement sufficient policies 
and procedures for laptop security.
208
 
 
[81] Under ISO 27002, organizations should adopt a “policy and 
supporting security measures . . . to manage the risks introduced by using 
mobile devices,” and also a “policy and supporting security measures . . . 
to protect information accessed, processed or stored at teleworking 
sites.”209  Guidance is also offered for management of assets,210 handling 
of assets,
211
 media handling,
212
 and management of equipment.
213
 
                                                                                                                                                       
205
 Id at 3. 
 
206
 See Press Release, U.S. Dep't of Health & Human Servs., Dermatology Practice 
Settles Potential HIPAA Violations (Dec. 26, 2013), available at 
http://www.hhs.gov/news/press/2013pres/12/20131226a.html, archived at 
http://perma.cc/8929-2G99. 
 
207
 See Press Release, U.S. Dep't of Health & Human Servs., Stolen Laptops Lead to 
Important HIPAA Settlements (Apr. 22, 2014), available at 
http://www.hhs.gov/news/press/2014pres/04/20140422b.html, archived at 
http://perma.cc/CM29-85YJ. 
 
208
 See id. 
 
209
 ISO 27002, supra note 5, at § 6.2. 
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[82] Under the NIST Cybersecurity Framework, control activities for 
mobile device and portable media security include “[a]ssets are formally 
managed throughout removal, transfers, and disposition,” and 
“[r]emovable media is protected and its use restricted according to 
policy.”214 
 
f.  System Change Management Controls 
 
[83] At most organizations, computer applications and systems are in a 
nearly constant state of flux.  System change management controls are 
designed to help ensure that security safeguards are not compromised in 
the acquisition, development, change, or retirement of computer systems. 
 
[84] Some legal requirements for information safeguards explicitly 
require controls to ensure that changes to computer systems involving 
protected information do not exacerbate security risks.
215
  Change 
management failures have also featured prominently in some FTC 
enforcement matters.  For example, in Credit Karma, a security feature 
(SSL certificate validation) was disabled in the testing environment during 
                                                                                                                                                       
210
 See id. at § 8.1 (inventory of assets, ownership of assets, acceptable use of assets, and 
return of assets). 
 
211
 See id. at § 8.2.3. 
 
212
 See id. at § 8.3 (management of removable media, disposal of media, and physical 
media transfer). 
 
213
 See id. at § 11.2.5 (removal of assets); see also id. at § 11.2.6 (security of equipment 
and assets off-premises); id. at § 11.2.7 (secure disposal or re-use of equipment). 
 
214
 Cybersecurity Framework, supra note 134, at 25, 29.  
 
215
 See, e.g., 12 C.F.R. pt. 30, app. B(III)(C)(1)(d) (2014) (“[p]rocedures designed to 
ensure that customer information system modifications are consistent with the bank’s 
information security program”) (Interagency Guidelines Establishing Information 
Security Standards under Gramm-Leach-Bliley).  
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development of a smartphone application, but the security feature was not 
re-enabled before the application was launched to consumers.
216
  In HTC 
America, website developers activated code during application 
development to capture and log information, but failed to deactivate the 
code before the smartphones and tablet devices were shipped to 
customers.
217
  In MTS, Inc., the respondent companies redesigned the 
“check out” portion of their website, rewriting software code for the Order 
Status application, but failed to ensure that certain code from the original 
version had been included in the new version, resulting in protected 
information being accessible in clear text.
218
  The FTC alleged that 
respondents failed to “implement appropriate checks and controls on the 
process of writing and revising Web applications . . . .”219  
 
[85] System change management controls have also been the focus of 
HIPAA enforcement.  In 2013, management care company WellPoint Inc. 
agreed to pay the U.S. Department of Health and Human Services $1.7 
million to resolve an investigation which determined that WellPoint failed 
to perform an appropriate technical evaluation of a software upgrade in its 
online application database, resulting in the ePHI of over 612,000 
individuals being accessible over the Internet.
220
  
 
[86] ISO 27002 offers guidance on a variety of controls covering both 
management of information system changes to ensure continued 
effectiveness of safeguards, and also prohibiting unauthorized changes in 
                                                             
216
 See Credit Karma Complaint at 3; see also Fandango Complaint at 3–4 (failure to 
restore Apple security default settings before releasing mobile application to customers). 
 
217
 See HTC America Complaint at 5. 
 
218
 See MTS and Tower Direct Complaint at 3. 
 
219
 See id. at 4. 
 
220
 See Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Health & Human Servs., WellPoint Pays HHS $1.7 
Million for Leaving Information Accessible Over Internet (July 11, 2013) available at 
http://www.hhs.gov/news/press/2013pres/07/20130711b.html, archived at 
http://perma.cc/CFM2-A5B4. 
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information systems.
221
  ISO 27002 also includes a range of controls for 
information system changes occurring through system acquisition, 
development, and maintenance activities, including the inclusion of 
information security in identifying requirements for new information 
systems or enhancements to existing information systems,
222
 in 
development and support processes for information systems,
223
 and for the 
protection of test data.
224
 
 
[87] The NIST Cybersecurity Framework provides a variety of control 
activities related to system change management under the Information 
Protection Processes and Procedures category, including “[a] baseline 
configuration of information technology/industrial control systems is 
created and maintained;” “[a] System Development Life Cycle to manage 
systems is implemented;” “[c]onfiguration change control processes are in 
place;” and “[a] vulnerability management plan is developed and 
implemented.”225  Additional control activities include “[t]he development 
and testing environment(s) are separate from the production environment,” 
and control activities for approved maintenance and repair or 
organizational assets, including remote maintenance.
226
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                             
221
 See ISO 27002, supra note 5, at §§ 12.1.2-12.1.4, 12.5.1, 12.6. 
 
222
 See id. at § 14.1.1. 
 
223
 See id. at § 14.2. 
 
224
 See id. at § 14.3.1. 
 
225
 Cybersecurity Framework, supra note 134, at 26–28. 
 
226
 See id. at 27–28. 
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g.  Employee Management Controls 
 
[88] Various safeguards controls are designed to address security risks 
involving the organization’s employees.  Beyond training (discussed 
below), controls may address employee selection and authorization to 
access protected information, segregation of duties involving protected 
information, discipline for security infractions, and controls regarding 
separated employees.  Various legal requirements for information 
safeguards address employee security controls.
227
   
 
[89] ISO 27002 provides controls for information security in human 
resource activities, including activities prior to employment,
228
 during 
                                                             
227
 See, e.g., 12 C.F.R. pt. 30, app. B(III)(C)(1)(e) (2014) (“[d]ual control procedures, 
segregation of duties, and employee background checks for employees with 
responsibilities for or access to customer information”) (Interagency Guidelines 
Establishing Information Security Standards under Gramm-Leach-Bliley); 16 C.F.R. §§ 
314.4(b)(1), (c) (2014) (requiring information safeguards to control identified risks, 
including risks involving “[e]mployee training and management”) (FTC Safeguards Rule 
under Gramm-Leach-Bliley); see also 201 MASS. CODE REGS. 17.03(2)(d), (e) (2014) 
(requiring “disciplinary measures for violations of the comprehensive information 
security program rules” and prevention of terminated employees from accessing records 
containing PII) (Massachusetts PII Protection Standards); OR. REV. STAT. ANN. § 
646A.622(2)(d)(A)(iv) (West 2011) (information security program deemed compliant if, 
among other matters, it includes managing of employees on security program practices 
and procedures) (Oregon PII Safeguards Statute).   
 
The HIPAA’s Security Rule requires application of “appropriate sanctions against 
workforce members who fail to comply with the security policies and procedures of the 
covered entity or business associate,”  45 C.F.R. § 164.308(a)(1)(ii)(C) (2013).   
 
HIPPA’s Security Rule also requires “policies and procedures to ensure that all members 
of [the] workforce have appropriate access to electronic protected health information . . . 
and to prevent those workforce members who do not have access . . . from obtaining 
access to electronic protected health information.”  45 C.F.R. § 164.308(a)(3)(i) (2013).  
Addressable implementation specifications include employee authorization and 
supervision, procedures for workforce clearance to access ePHI, and procedures for 
termination of such access upon employee separation.  45 C.F.R. § 164.308(a)(3)(ii) 
(2013).   
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employment,
229
 and on termination or change of employment.
230
  
Guidance is also offered for controls regarding employee confidentiality 
or nondisclosure agreements.
231
  Under the NIST Cybersecurity 
Framework, “[c]ybersecurity is included in human resources practices 
(e.g., deprovisioning, personnel screening).”232   
 
h.  Environmental Risk Controls 
 
[90] Protected information can be at risk for loss or damage due to 
environmental hazards, such as fire or water damage, or failures in 
computer systems.  Controls for environmental hazards are designed to 
help ensure the integrity and safeguarding of information throughout the 
course of such events.  Some laws requiring information safeguards 
specifically mandate controls for environmental hazards.
233
 
 
[91] Under ISO 27002, “[p]hysical protection against natural disasters, 
malicious attack or accidents should be designed and applied.” 234  
                                                                                                                                                       
228
 See ISO 27002, supra note 5, at § 7.1. 
 
229
 See id. at § 7.2 
 
230
 See id. at § 7.3.1. 
 
231
 See id. at § 13.2.4. 
 
232
 Cybersecurity Framework, supra note 134, at 28. 
 
233
 See, e.g., 12 C.F.R. pt. 30, app. B(III)(C)(1)(h) (2014) (Interagency Guidelines 
Establishing Information Security Standards under Gramm-Leach-Bliley).  The HIPAA 
Security Rule requires “policies and procedures for responding to an emergency or other 
occurrence (for example, fire, vandalism, system failure, and natural disaster) that 
damages systems that contain electronic protected health information,” including data 
backup plans, disaster recovery plans, and emergency mode operation plans.  See 45 
C.F.R. §§ 164.308(a)(7)(i), (ii)(A)–(C) (2013).  Addressable implementation 
specifications include testing and revision procedures and analysis of applications and 
data criticality.  See, e.g., 45 C.F.R. § 164.308(a)(7)(ii)(D)–(E) (2013). 
 
234
 See ISO 27002, supra note 5, at § 11.1.4. 
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Guidance is offered on controls for environmental risks involving 
equipment.
235
  “Backup copies of information, software and system 
images should be taken and tested regularly in accordance with an agreed 
backup policy.” 236   Control guidance is also provided on information 
security continuity
237
 and availability of redundant information processing 
facilities.
238
  Control activities for environmental hazards under the NIST 
Cybersecurity Framework include “[d]ata-at-rest is protected” and 
“[b]ackups of information are conducted, maintained, and tested 
periodically.”239  
 
i.  Monitoring & Detection Controls 
 
[92] This family of safeguard controls is designed to help the 
organization be cognizant of activity involving protected information, 
including monitoring for unauthorized intrusion or access and protection 
against and detection of malware or system attacks.
240
  Such controls may 
involve logging and audit controls, system activity reviews, and use of 
software for prevention and detection.  Legal requirements for information 
safeguards commonly address system monitoring and detection 
controls.
241
   
                                                             
235
 See e.g., id. at § 11.2 (for example, equipment siting and protection, supporting 
utilities, and cabling security).   
 
236
 Id. at § 12.3.1.  
 
237
 See, e.g., id. at § 17.1 (planning information security continuity; implementing 
information security continuity; verify, review and evaluate information security 
continuity). 
 
238
 See, e.g., id. at § 17.2.1. 
 
239
 Cybersecurity Framework, supra note 134, at 25, 27. 
 
240
 See, e.g., FTC Business Guidance, supra note 63 at 17 (“Detecting Breaches” under 
the “Lock It” Principle). 
 
241
 See, e.g., 12 C.F.R. pt. 30, app. B (III)(C)(1)(f) (2014) (“[m]onitoring systems and 
procedures to detect actual and attempted attacks on or intrusions into customer 
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[93] The FTC has frequently alleged in its data security enforcement 
actions that the respondent company failed to employ sufficient measures 
to monitor and detect unauthorized access to consumers’ personal 
information,
242
 such as in Cbr Systems, Inc., where FTC alleged that the 
respondent  
                                                                                                                                                       
information systems”) (Interagency Guidelines Establishing Information Security 
Standards under Gramm-Leach-Bliley); 16 C.F.R. §§ 314.4(b)(3), (c) (2014) (requiring 
information safeguards to control identified risks, including risks in “[d]etecting, 
preventing and responding to attacks, intrusions, or other systems failures.”) (FTC 
Safeguards Rule under Gramm-Leach-Bliley).   
 
The HIPAA Security Rule requires “procedures to regularly review records of 
information system activity, such as audit logs, access reports, and security incident 
tracking reports,” 45 C.F.R. § 164.308(a)(1)(ii)(D) (2013), implementation of “hardware, 
software, and/or procedural mechanisms that record and examine activity in information 
systems that contain or use electronic protected health information,” 45 C.F.R. § 
164.312(b) (2013), and “policies and procedures to protect electronic protected health 
information from improper alteration or destruction,” 45 C.F.R. § 164.312(c)(1) (2013).   
 
Addressable implementation specifications include “procedures to regularly review 
records of information system activity, such as audit logs, access reports, and security 
incident tracking reports,” 45 C.F.R. § 164.308(a)(1)(ii)(D) (2013), “[p]rocedures for 
guarding against, detecting, and reporting malicious software,” 45 C.F.R. § 
164.308(a)(5)(ii)(B) (2013), “[p]rocedures for monitoring log-in attempts and reporting 
discrepancies,” 45 C.F.R. § 164.308(a)(5)(ii)(C) (2013), and implementing “electronic 
mechanisms to corroborate that electronic protected health information has not been 
altered or destroyed in an authorized manner,” 45 C.F.R. § 164.312(c)(2) (2013).   
 
The Massachusetts PII Protection Standards require, “to the extent technically feasible . . 
. [r]easonable monitoring of systems, for unauthorized use of or access to personal 
information, . . . [r]easonably up-to-date firewall protection and operating system security 
patches” for files containing PII on systems connected to the Internet; and “reasonably 
up-to-date versions of system security agent software . . . .”  See 201 MASS. CODE REGS. 
17.04(4), (6), (7) (2014); see also OR. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 646A.622(2)(d)(B)(iii), (C)(ii) 
(West 2011) (information security program deemed compliant if it includes, among other 
matters, detection and prevention for attacks or system failures and detection and 
prevention for intrusions) (Oregon PII Safeguards Statute). 
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Failed to employ sufficient measures to prevent, detect, and 
investigate unauthorized access to computer networks, such 
as by adequately monitoring web traffic, confirming 
distribution of anti-virus software, employing an automated 
intrusion detection system, retaining certain system logs, or 
systematically reviewing system logs for security threats.
243
  
 
[94] ISO 27002 offers controls regarding system logging and 
monitoring,
244
 information systems audit controls,
245
 and detecting, 
preventing, and recovering from malware.
246
 
 
[95] Logging and monitoring activities are addressed in the NIST 
Cybersecurity Framework, including “[i]ntegrity checking mechanisms 
are used to verify software, firmware, and information integrity,” and 
[a]udit/log records are determined, documented, implemented, and 
reviewed in accordance with policy.”247  Under the Security Continuous 
Monitoring category,  
 
The network is monitored to detect potential cybersecurity 
events; . . . [t]he physical environment is monitored to 
detect potential cybersecurity events; . . .[p]ersonnel 
                                                                                                                                                       
242
 See, e.g., LifeLock Complaint at 9–10; BJ’s Wholesale Club Complaint at 2; 
Cardsystems Solutions Complaint at 2; Cbr Systems Complaint at 2–3; ChoicePoint 
Complaint at 9; DSW Complaint at 2; Genica Complaint at 2–3; Guidance Software 
Complaint at 2; LabMD Complaint at 3; Microsoft Complaint at 2. 
 
243
 Cbr Systems Complaint at 3. 
 
244
 See ISO 27002, supra note 5, at § 12.4 (setting standards for event logging, protection 
of log information, administrator and operator logs, and clock synchronisation).  
 
245
 See id. at § 12.7.1. 
 
246
 See id. at § 12.2.1. 
 
247
 See Cybersecurity Framework, supra note 134, at 26, 29. 
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activity is monitored to detect potential cybersecurity 
events; . . . [m]alicious code is detected; . . . [u]nauthorized 
mobile code is detected; . . . [e]xternal service provider 
activity is monitored to detect potential cybersecurity 
events; . . . [m]onitoring for unauthorized personnel, 
connections, devices, and software is performed; [and] . . . 
[v]ulnerability scans are performed.
248
   
 
Also, under the Detection Processes category, “[r]oles and responsibilities 
for detection are well defined to ensure accountability; . . . [d]etection 
activities comply with all applicable requirements; . . . [d]etection 
processes are tested; . . . [e]vent detection information is communicated to 
appropriate parties; [and] . . . [d]etection processes are continuously 
improved.”249 
 
j.  Retention Controls 
 
[96] An additional safeguard measure for protected information is to 
ensure that it is not retained for longer than is necessary to comply with 
legal retention requirements and business need.
250
  It is not possible to 
have a security breach compromising protected information that no longer 
exists, having been compliantly disposed of once its legally required 
retention and business value have expired. 
 
[97] Some legal requirements for information security programs 
explicitly address disposal of protected information once it has served its 
valid business purpose.  For example, contracts between HIPAA covered 
entities and business associates must require that the business associate 
“[a]t termination of the contract, if feasible, return or destroy all protected 
                                                             
248
 See id. at 30–31. 
 
249
 Id. at 31–32. 
 
250
 See, e.g., FTC Business Guidance, supra note 63, at 6–7 (referencing the “Scale 
Down” Principle and “keep[ing] only what you need for your business”). 
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health information received from, or created or received by the business 
associate on behalf of, the covered entity.”251   
 
[98] In several data security enforcement matters the FTC has found 
fault with companies’ unnecessary retention of protected information, 
alleging that such practices create unnecessary risks to the information’s 
security.
252
  
 
[99] The NIST Cybersecurity Framework includes as a control activity 
that “[d]ata is destroyed according to policy.”253  It is presumably fair to 
interpret this control as pertaining not only to policies for compliant means 
of disposal, but also to policies regarding the length of time categories of 
information are kept by the organization, such as retention schedules. 
 
k.  Disposal Controls 
 
[100] Various safeguards may be employed to control risks in connection 
with the ultimate disposal of protected information.  Such controls should 
also address the disposal, return, and re-use of hardware devices and 
media that contain protected information,
254
 as well as the destruction of 
protected information in hard copy media. 
                                                             
251
 45 C.F.R. § 164.504(e)(2)(J) (2013).  The HIPAA Privacy Rule “return or destroy” 
requirement applies to all such PHI and all copies, and if return or destruction is not 
feasible, the contract must extend safeguard obligations to such information remaining in 
the business associate’s custody.  Id. 
 
252
 See, e.g., BJ’s Wholesale Club Complaint at 2; Cbr Systems Complaint at 3; Ceridian 
Corp. Complaint at 2; DSW Complaint at 2; Life is Good Complaint at 2. 
 
253
 Cybersecurity Framework, supra note 134, at 27. 
 
254
 See Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Health & Human Servs., HHS Settles with Health 
Plan in Photocopier Breach Case (Aug. 14, 2013) available at 
http://www.hhs.gov/news/press/2013pres/08/20130814a.html (explaining that in 2013, 
Affinity Health Plan Inc. agreed to pay over $1.2 million to resolve an HHS investigation 
under HIPAA, which determined that Affinity Health returned multiple copiers to its 
leasing company without erasing data on the copiers’ hard drives, exposing ePHI of 
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[101] A wide range of information security requirements address proper 
disposal of storage devices or media containing such information.  Legal 
requirements for information security programs commonly include 
controls for disposal of protected information.
255
  As noted previously, the 
FACTA Disposal Rules of various regulators require that reasonable 
measures be taken in disposing of protected customer information to 
safeguard against “unauthorized access to or use of the information in 
connection with its disposal.”256  A majority of states require entities with 
PII of state residents to have disposal safeguards, mandating either a 
disposal policy for PII
257
 or compliant practices for reasonable disposal of 
PII—such as the shredding of hardcopy documents, affective erasure of 
electronic media, or other actions to render PII unreadable or 
indecipherable.
258
  Many organizations contract with service providers for 
disposal of documents and electronic data containing protected 
information.  Legal requirements for disposal contracting are discussed 
below.
259
 
 
                                                                                                                                                       
almost 345,000 individuals), archived at http://perma.cc/L7YB-3GCV; see also FTC. 
Business Guidance, supra note 63, at 15 (referencing the digital copiers under the “Lock 
It” principle); id. at 21 (citing the “Pitch It” principle that one should “properly dispose of 
what you no longer need.”). 
 
255
 See, e.g., 12 C.F.R. pt. 30, app. B(III)(C)(4) (2014) (citing the interagency guidelines 
establishing information security standards under Gramm-Leach-Bliley); 16 C.F.R. § 
314.4(b)–(c) (2014) (requiring information safeguards to control identified risks, 
including risks in information disposal); 45 C.F.R. § 164.310(d)(2)(i) (2013) (requiring 
“policies and procedures to address the final disposition of electronic protected health 
information, and/or the hardware or electronic media on which it is stored.”).   
 
256
 See supra note 26.   
 
257
 See supra note 33 and accompanying text. 
 
258
 See supra note 34 and accompanying text. 
 
259
 See infra text accompanying notes 287–88.  
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[102] The FTC has entered into consent orders with several companies 
for failing to comply with disposal safeguards under FACTA and Gramm-
Leach-Bliley.
260
  In enforcement actions against national pharmacy chains, 
the FTC has alleged that widespread unsecure disposal of customer 
personal information is an unfair and deceptive trade practice.
261
   
 
[103] ISO 27002 offers controls related to disposal of media containing 
protected information
262
 and for secure disposal or re-use of equipment 
containing protected information.
263
 
                                                             
260
 See, e.g., American United Complaint at 3–4 (Under FACTA Disposal Rule, failure to 
implement reasonable procedures for disposal of customers’ personal information, 
customer personal information repeatedly found in unsecured dumpster and open trash 
bags); Complaint at 5–6, FTC v. Gregory Navone, No. 2:08-cv-01842(D. Nev. Dec. 30, 
2008) [hereinafter Navone Complaint], 
http://www.ftc.gov/sites/default/files/documents/cases/2009/01/090121navonecmpt.pdf 
(Under FACTA, failure to oversee collection and transport of personal information for 
disposal, 40 boxes containing tax returns, mortgage applications, bank statements, copies 
of credit cards and drivers’ licenses, and consumer reports found in publically accessible 
dumpster), archived at http://perma.cc/X2XB-C5YB; Complaint at 5–6, United States v. 
PLS Financial Services, Inc., No. 1:12-cv-08334 (N.D. Ill. Oct. 17, 2012) [hereinafter 
PLS Complaint], 
http://www.ftc.gov/sites/default/files/documents/cases/2012/11/121107plspaydaycmpt.pd
f (Under FACTA, failure to take reasonable measures against unauthorized access or use 
of consumer report information in disposal, documents containing customer names, 
Social Security numbers, wage and bank account information, cancelled checks, loan 
applications and agreements, and consumer reports found in unsecured, easily accessible 
dumpsters), archived at http://perma.cc/H7C7-GM97; Nations Title Agency Complaint at 
1-2 (Under Gramm-Leach-Bliley, failure to implement reasonable procedures for 
disposal of personal information, television station found intact documents with sensitive 
personal information discarded in unsecured dumpster).   
 
261
 See, e.g., CVS Complaint at 2–3 (failure to implement procedures to securely dispose 
of customers’ personal information, discarding materials containing personal information 
in clear readable text in unsecured, public trash dumpsters, media outlets reported finding 
such personal information in unsecured dumpsters in at least fifteen cities); Rite Aid 
Complaint at 2–3 (failure to implement secure disposal procedures, discarding materials 
containing personal information in clear readable text in unsecured dumpsters, media 
reports of finding personal information in unsecured dumpsters in at least seven cities).  
 
262
 See ISO 27002, supra note 5, at § 8.3.2. 
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[104] The NIST Cybersecurity Framework includes subcategories of 
control activities for secure disposal, including “[a]ssets are formally 
managed throughout removal, transfers, and disposition” and “[d]ata is 
destroyed according to policy.”264 
 
3.  Training 
 
[105] An organization should use training and other awareness-building 
efforts to help ensure that its employees understand their responsibilities 
regarding information security.
265
  Training is commonly referenced in 
legal requirements for information security programs.
266
  Inadequate 
training is also frequently cited by the FTC in its enforcement 
proceedings, including employee guidance and training on such matters as 
                                                                                                                                                       
263
 See id. at § 11.2.7. 
 
264
 Cybersecurity Framework, supra note 134, at 25, 27. 
 
265
 See FTC Business Guidance, supra note 63, at 17 (“Employee Training” under the 
“Lock It” Principle). 
 
266
 See, e.g., 12 C.F.R. pt. 30, app. B(III)(C)(2) (2014) (Interagency Guidelines 
Establishing Information Security Standards under Gramm-Leach-Bliley); 16 C.F.R. § 
314.4(b)(1), (c) (2014) (implement safeguards to control identified risks, including 
“[e]mployee training and management”) (FTC Safeguards Rule under Gramm-Leach-
Bliley).  The HIPAA Security Rule requires covered entities and business associates to 
“[i]mplement a security awareness and training program for all members of its workforce 
(including management).”  45 C.F.R. § 164.308(a)(5)(i) (2013).  Addressable 
implementation specifications include periodic security updates and procedures for 
protecting against, detecting, and reporting malware.  45 C.F.R. § 164.308(a)(5)(ii)(A)–
(B) (2013); see also 201 MASS. CODE REGS. 17.03(2)(b)(1), 17.04(8) (2014) (requiring 
risk assessment to evaluate and improve effectiveness of “ongoing employee (including 
temporary and contract employee) training” and also requiring “[e]ducation and training 
of employees on the proper use of the computer security system and the importance of 
personal information security.”) (Massachusetts PII Protection Standards); OR. REV. 
STAT. ANN. § 646A.622(2)(d)(A)(iv) (West 2011) (information security program deemed 
compliant if it includes, among other matters, training of employees on the security 
program practices and procedures) (Oregon PII Safeguards Statute). 
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privacy and information security generally;
267
 the prevention of 
unauthorized disclosure of personal information;
268
 proper design, review, 
and testing of security for applications and software, for employees with 
those responsibilities;
269
 secure access from remote locations;
270
 proper 
response to security incidents;
271
 and secure disposal.
272
   
 
[106] Under ISO 27002, “[a]ll employees of the organization and, where 
relevant, contractors should receive appropriate [information security] 
awareness education and training and regular updates in organizational 
policies and procedures, as relevant for their job function.”273 
 
[107] Awareness and Training under the NIST Cybersecurity Framework 
means that “[t]he organization’s personnel and partners are provided 
cybersecurity awareness education and are adequately trained to perform 
their information security-related duties and responsibilities consistent 
with related policies, procedures, and agreements.”274  NIST training and 
awareness measures include “[a]ll users are informed and trained,” and 
roles and responsibilities are understood by “privileged users,” “third-
party stakeholders (e.g., suppliers, customers, partners),” “[s]enior 
executives,” and “[p]hysical and information security personnel.”275  
                                                             
267
 See, e.g., Eli Lily Complaint at 3; Nationwide Complaint at 3; Upromise Complaint at 
4–5.  
 
268
 See, e.g., EPN Complaint at 2. 
 
269
 See, e.g., MTS and Tower Direct Complaint at 3–4; TRENDnet Complaint at 4–5. 
 
270
See, e.g., Sunbelt Lending Complaint at 2. 
 
271
 See, e.g., Goal Financial Complaint at 2. 
 
272
 See, e.g., CVS Complaint at 2; PLS Complaint at 5–6; Rite Aid Complaint at 2–3. 
 
273
 ISO 27002, supra note 5, at § 7.2.2. 
 
274
 Cybersecurity Framework, supra note 134, at 24. 
 
275
 Id. at 24–25. 
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4.  Testing 
 
[108] Organizations should have a reasonable approach to testing and 
monitoring the effectiveness of their information security policies, 
procedures, and controls to determine whether they are operating as 
intended.  Such testing is generally more reliable if it is performed by an 
independent internal staff or independent third-parties, rather than by 
individuals responsible for the particular security function or control being 
tested.   
 
[109] Testing and monitoring of security controls feature prominently in 
legal requirements for information security programs.
276
  Under the U.S.-
EU Safe Harbor Framework’s Enforcement Principle “procedures for 
verifying that the commitments companies make to adhere to the safe 
                                                             
276
 See, e.g., 12 C.F.R. pt. 30, app. B(III)(C)(3) (2014).  The Interagency Guidelines 
Establishing Information Security Standards under Gramm-Leach-Bliley state:  
 
Regularly test the key controls, systems and procedures of the 
information security program.  The frequency and nature of such tests 
should be determined by the bank's risk assessment.  Tests should be 
conducted or reviewed by independent third parties or staff independent 
of those that develop or maintain the security programs.  
 
Id.; see also16 C.F.R. § 314.4(c) (2014)(“[R]egularly test or otherwise monitor the 
effectiveness of the safeguards’ key controls, systems, and procedures.”) (FTC 
Safeguards Rule under Gramm-Leach-Bliley); 45 C.F.R. § 164.308(a)(8) (2013) 
(“Perform a periodic technical and nontechnical evaluation . . . that establishes the extent 
to which a covered entity’s or business associate’s security policies and procedures meet 
the requirements of this subpart.”) (HIPAA Security Rule); see also 201 MASS. CODE 
REGS. 17.03(2)(h) (2013) (requiring “[r]egular monitoring to ensure that the 
comprehensive information security program is operating in a manner reasonably 
calculated to prevent unauthorized access to or unauthorized use of personal information . 
. . .”) (Massachusetts PII Protection Standards); OR. REV. STAT. ANN. § 
646A.622(2)(d)(B)(iv) (West 2011) (requiring an information security program that 
“[r]egularly tests and monitors the effectiveness of key controls, systems, and 
procedures” to bring it into compliance with the statute) (Oregon PII Safeguards Statute). 
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harbor principles have been implemented . . . ,”277 either through self-
assessment or outside compliance reviews.
278
  Additionally, FTC consent 
orders commonly require “regular testing and monitoring of the 
effectiveness of the safeguards’ key controls, systems, and procedures.”279  
Such consent orders generally also require periodic assessments and 
reports of the security program’s effectiveness by “a qualified, objective, 
independent third-party professional who uses procedures and standards 
generally accepted in the profession.”280 
 
[110] Under ISO 27002, “[t]he organization’s approach to managing 
information security and its implementation (i.e. control objectives, 
controls, policies, processes and procedures for information security) 
should be reviewed independently at planned intervals or when significant 
changes occur.”281  “Managers should regularly review the compliance of 
information processing and procedures within their area of responsibility 
with the appropriate security policies, standards and any other security 
requirements.” 282   And, “[i]nformation systems should be regularly 
reviewed for compliance with the organization’s information security 
                                                             
277
 U.S.-EU Safe Harbor Overview, EXPORT.GOV, 
http://www.export.gov/safeharbor/eu/eg_main_018476.asp (last visited Oct. 1, 2014), 
archived at http://perma.cc/GKH9-ZLAX. 
 
278
 See U.S.-EU Safe Harbor FAQ 7-Verification, EXPORT.GOV, 
http://www.export.gov/safeharbor/eu/eg_main_018379.asp (last visited Oct. 1, 2014), 
archived at http://perma.cc/MUV4-8MBR. 
 
279
 See Accretive Health Order at 3; see also consent orders cited supra note 43 (consent 
orders under Gramm-Leach-Bliley); consent orders cited supra note 45 (consent orders 
under COPPA); and consent orders cited supra notes 51, 52, and 54 (consent orders under 
FTC Act § 5). 
 
280
 E.g., Accretive Health Order at 3; see also consent orders cited supra notes 43, 45, 51, 
52, and 54. 
 
281
 ISO 27002, supra note 5, at § 18.2.1. 
 
282
 Id. at § 18.2.2. 
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policies and standards.”283  Such technical compliance review can involve 
penetration tests or vulnerability assessments, and, if so, “caution should 
be exercised as such activities could lead to a compromise of the security 
of the system.  Such tests should be planned, documented and 
repeatable.”284  Additionally, the NIST Cybersecurity Framework includes 
activities for testing security controls, including “[v]ulnerability scans are 
performed” and “[d]etection processes are tested.”285 
 
D.   Contract 
 
An Organization Should Address the Security of Protected 
Information in its Third-Party Relationships 
 
[111] In a reasonable information security program, an organization 
should address identified threats, vulnerabilities, and risks to the security 
of protected information arising from its relationships with third-parties 
that receive, create, maintain, or transmit protected information on the 
organization’s behalf. 286   Consideration should also be given to third-
parties that do not have custody of the organization’s protected 
information, but that nevertheless have direct or indirect access to the 
organization’s computer systems, thereby creating vulnerabilities for 
hacking or other intrusions.   
 
[112] Legal requirements for information security commonly mandate 
that the safeguarding of protected information be addressed in third-party 
relationships.  Various safeguard rules promulgated under Gramm-Leach-
Bliley require oversight of service provider arrangements in three phases 
                                                             
283
 Id. at § 18.2.3. 
 
284
 Id. 
 
285
 Cybersecurity Framework, supra note 134, at 31–32. 
 
286
 See FTC Business Guidance, supra note 63, at 19 (explaining the “Security Practices 
of Contractors and Service Providers” under the “Lock It” Principle). 
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of the relationship: due diligence in service provider selection; contracting 
that obligates the service provider to implement appropriate security 
measures; and monitoring of service provider performance in that 
regard.
287
  The HIPAA Security Rules require compliant written business 
associate agreements between covered entities and business associates, 
and also between business associates and subcontractors, who “create, 
receive, maintain, or transmit electronic protected health information on 
the covered entity’s [or business associate’s] behalf.”288  
 
[113] Under California, Maryland, Nevada, and Rhode Island laws, 
businesses that disclose state residents’ PII to non-affiliated third-parties 
must contract with them to require such third-parties to establish PII 
security procedures and practices.
289
  Massachusetts and Oregon mandate 
information security programs that, among other matters, require PII 
protection to be addressed in service provider contracts.
290
   
  
[114] Federal and state laws also address contracting with service 
providers for disposal of protected information.  For example, the FTC’s 
Disposal Rule under FACTA provides that organizations must comply 
with their obligation to properly dispose of consumer information by, 
“[a]fter due diligence, entering into and monitoring compliance with a 
contract with another party engaged in the business of record destruction 
                                                             
287
 See, e.g., 12 C.F.R. pt. 30, app. B(III)(D)(1)–(3) (2014) (regarding monitoring, “a 
bank should review audits, summaries of test results, or other equivalent evaluations of 
its service providers”) (Interagency Guidelines Establishing Information Security 
Standards under Gramm-Leach-Bliley); 16 C.F.R. § 314.4(d)(1) –(2) (2014) (detailing 
the FTC Safeguards Rule under Gramm-Leach-Bliley).    
 
288
 See 45 C.F.R. § 164.308(b)(1) (2013); see also 45 C.F.R. § 164.314(a) (2013). 
 
289
 See, e.g., CAL. CIV. CODE § 1798.81.5(c) (LexisNexis Supp. 2014); MD. CODE ANN., 
COM. LAW § 14-3503(b)(1) (LexisNexis Supp. 2013); NEV. REV. STAT. § 603A.210(2) 
(LexisNexis Supp. 2010); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 11-49.2-2(3) (Supp. 2013).   
 
290
 See, e.g., 201 MASS. CODE REGS. 17.03(2)(f)(2) (2014); OR. REV. STAT. ANN. § 
646A.622(2)(d)(A)(v) (West 2011). 
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to dispose of material, specifically identified as consumer information, in a 
manner consistent with this rule.”291  Various states, including Alaska, 
Hawaii, Illinois, North Carolina, and South Carolina, similarly require 
compliant contracting with service providers for PII disposal.
292
   
 
[115] Under its Gramm-Leach-Bliley enforcement authority, the FTC 
has pursued companies for failure to ensure—by contract—that their 
service providers will protect the security and confidentiality of protected 
information.
293
  The FTC has also taken the position that inadequate 
contracting and oversight for service providers with protected information 
access can constitute an unfair and deceptive trade practice under Section 
                                                             
291
 16 C.F.R. § 682.3(b)(3) (2014).  The Disposal Rule under FACTA provides examples 
of compliant due diligence, including:  
 
Reviewing an independent audit of the disposal company’s operations 
and/or its compliance with this rule, obtaining information about the 
disposal company from several references or other reliable sources, 
requiring that the disposal company be certified by a recognized trade 
association or similar third party, reviewing and evaluating the disposal 
company's information security policies or procedures, or taking other 
appropriate measures to determine the competency and integrity of the 
potential disposal company. 
 
Id.; see also supra note 26 (highlighting that Disposal Rules in regulations for other 
financial institutions). 
 
292
 See, e.g., ALASKA STAT. § 45.48.510(3) (2012); HAW. REV. STAT. ANN. § 487R-2(c) 
(LexisNexis Supp. 2012); 815 ILL. COMP. STAT. § 530/40(c) (West Supp. 2013); N.C. 
GEN. STAT. § 75-64(c) (2013); S.C. CODE ANN. § 37-20-190(B) (Supp. 2013). 
 
293
 See, e.g., Goal Financial Complaint at 2 (failing “to require third-party service 
providers by contract to protect the security and confidentiality of personal 
information.”); James B. Nutter & Co. Complaint at 2 (providing “back-up tapes 
containing personal information in clear readable text to a third-party service provider,” 
without requiring the service provider to protect the information’s security and 
confidentiality); Nations Title Agency Complaint at 2 (failing to provide reasonable 
oversight for handling of personal information by service providers employed to process 
and assist in real estate closings); Sunbelt Lending Complaint at 2 (failing to take steps to 
ensure service providers were providing appropriate security for customer information).  
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5 of the FTC Act.  For example, in GeneLink, Inc. and foru
TM
 
International Corporation, the respondent companies collected customers’ 
genetic information for the purpose of “tailoring” skincare products and 
nutritional supplements to the genetic circumstances of customers.  
GeneLink and foru
TM
 permitted their service providers to access collected 
personal information in order to maintain GeneLink and foru
TM’s 
customer relationship databases, fulfill customer orders, and develop 
related applications.
294
  According to the FTC, GeneLink and foru
TM 
“[f]ailed to require by contract that service providers implement and 
maintain appropriate safeguards for consumers’ personal information” and 
“[f]ailed to provide reasonable oversight of service providers, for instance 
by requiring that service providers implement simple, low-cost, and 
readily available defenses to protect consumers’ personal information.”295  
The resulting consent decrees required GeneLink and foru
TM 
to develop 
and use “reasonable steps to select and retain service providers capable of 
appropriately safeguarding Personal Information received” from the 
companies, and further required them to require “service providers by 
contract to implement and maintain appropriate safeguards . . . .”296   
 
[116] FTC enforcement actions have also addressed service provider 
relationships in which protected information was not made accessible to 
the service provider, but that nevertheless created risks to the security of 
protected information.  For example, in Wyndham, a pending enforcement 
lawsuit under Section 5 of the FTC Act, the FTC has alleged it is a 
deceptive and unfair trade practice to fail to restrict service provider 
network access, “such as by restricting connections to specified IP 
addresses or granting temporary, limited access, as necessary.” 297  
                                                             
294
 See, e.g., GeneLink and foru
TM
 Complaint at 12. 
 
295
 Id. at 13. 
 
296
 See GeneLink Order at 7; Consent Order at 7, In re foru
TM Int’l. Corp., No. C-4457 
(F.T.C. May 8, 2014) [hereinafter foru
TM
 Order], 
http://www.ftc.gov/system/files/documents/cases/140512foruintdo.pdf, archived at 
http://perma.cc/TP5Z-97RF. 
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Similarly, in the matter of Credit Karma, also an enforcement action under 
Section 5 of the FTC Act, the FTC alleged that it was a deceptive and 
unfair practice for the respondent to fail in providing “reasonable 
oversight of its service providers during the development process” of a 
mobile application that allegedly allowed unauthorized access to protected 
information.
298
 
 
[117] FTC Consent Orders commonly require “[t]he development and 
use of reasonable steps to select and retain service providers capable of 
appropriately safeguarding personal information they receive from 
respondent, and requiring service providers by contract to implement and 
maintain appropriate safeguards.”299 
 
[118] ISO 27002 offers guidance and controls for establishing 
information security in supplier relationships, including information 
security policies for supplier relationships, addressing security within 
supplier agreements, and establishing security requirements for the 
information and communication technology supply chain.
300
  Controls are 
also provided for monitoring and review of supplier services and 
managing changes to supplier services.
301
  Control guidance is also 
                                                                                                                                                       
297
 Wyndham Worldwide Complaint at 2, 12; see also LifeLock Complaint at 10 
(alleging that the company “[f]ailed to require . . . vendors, and others with access to 
personal information to use hard-to-guess passwords or to implement related security 
measures, such as periodically changing passwords or suspending users after a certain 
number of unsuccessful log-in attempts . . . .”). 
 
298
 Credit Karma Complaint at 4. 
 
299
 See, e.g., Accretive Health Order at 3; see also consent orders cited supra note 45 
(consent orders under Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act and COPPA containing similar 
language); and consent orders cited supra notes 51–52, 54 (consent orders under FTC 
Act § 5 containing similar language). 
 
300
 ISO 27002, supra note 5, at §§ 15.1.1–15.1.3. 
 
301
 See id. at §§ 15.2.1–15.2.2. 
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provided regarding agreements on information transfer and confidentiality 
and non-disclosure agreements.
302
 
 
[119] The NIST Cybersecurity Framework provides control activities 
regarding third parties, including “[c]ybersecurity roles and 
responsibilities for . . . third-party stakeholders (e.g., suppliers, customers, 
partners) are established”; “[i]nformation security roles & responsibilities 
are coordinated and aligned with . . . external partners”; and “[t]hird-party 
stakeholders (e.g., suppliers, customers, partners) understand roles & 
responsibilities.”303 
 
E.   Respond 
 
An Organization Should Respond to Detected Breaches of 
the Security of Protected Information 
 
[120] Organizations should be prepared to respond to detected breaches 
in the security of protected information, consistent with applicable legal 
requirements and obligations to third-parties.
304
  Legal requirements for 
information security programs commonly require that covered 
organizations have the capability to respond when unauthorized access to 
protected information occurs.
305
   
                                                             
302
 See id. at §§ 13.2.2, 13.2.4. 
 
303
 Cybersecurity Framework, supra note 134, at 20–21, 24. 
 
304
 See FTC Business Guidance, supra note 63 at 22–23 (the “Plan Ahead” Principle, 
“[c]reate a plan for responding to security incidents.”). 
 
305
 See, e.g., 12 C.F.R. pt. 30, app. B(III)(C)(1)(g) (2014) (requiring “[r]esponse programs 
that specify actions to be taken when the bank suspects or detects that unauthorized 
individuals have gained access to customer information systems, including appropriate 
reports to regulatory and law enforcement agencies . . . .”) (Interagency Guidelines 
Establishing Information Security Standards under Gramm-Leach-Bliley); 16 C.F.R. § 
314.4(b)(3), (c) (2014) (requiring safeguards to control identified risks, including in 
detecting and responding “to attacks, intrusions, or other systems failures.”) (FTC 
Safeguards Rule under Gramm-Leach-Bliley); HIPAA Security Rule, 45 C.F.R. § 
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[121] Numerous laws require breach notification to affected individuals 
and, in certain circumstances, to governmental and other authorities if a 
breach occurs to protected information.  HIPAA breach notifications are 
governed by 45 C.F.R. Part 164, Subpart D.  Though the Gramm-Leach-
Bliley Act does not itself require breach notification, the rules of various 
entities that regulate financial institutions promulgated under Gramm-
Leach-Bliley require such notifications be made as part of the institution’s 
mandated response programs.
306
  As discussed previously, forty-seven 
states, Puerto Rico, Guam, and the U.S. Virgin Islands require covered 
businesses with PII of the jurisdiction’s residents to provide notice if an 
unauthorized disclosure or breach of PII occurs.
307
 
 
[122] ISO 27002 provides a series of controls regarding information 
security incident management, addressing such matters as responsibilities 
and procedures, reporting information security events, reporting 
information security weaknesses, assessment of and decisions responding 
to information security events, learning from information security 
incidents, and collection of evidence.
308
 
                                                                                                                                                       
164.308(a)(6) (2013) (requiring “policies and procedures to address security incidents” 
and covered entities and business associates to “[i]dentify and respond to suspected or 
known security incidents; mitigate, to the extent practicable, harmful effects of security 
incidents that are known to the covered entity or business associate; and document 
security incidents and their outcomes.”); see also Massachusetts PII Protection Standards, 
201 MASS. CODE REGS. 17.03(2)(j) (2014) (requiring “[d]ocumenting responsive actions 
taken in connection with any incident involving a breach of security . . . .”); Oregon PII 
Safeguards Statute, OR. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 646A.622(2)(d)(B)(iii), (C)(ii) (West 2011) 
(information security program deemed compliant if it includes detection and response to 
attacks or system failures and intrusions). 
 
306
 See, e.g., Interagency Guidance on Response Programs for Unauthorized Access to 
Customer Information and Customer Notice, 12 C.F.R. pt. 30, app. B, supp. A (2014); 
Guidance on Response Programs for Unauthorized Access to Member Information and 
Member Notice (NCUA), 12 C.F.R. pt. 748, app. B (2014). 
 
307
 See supra text accompanying note 89. 
 
308
 ISO 27002, supra note 5, at §§ 16.1.1-16.1.4, 16.1.6, 16.1.7. 
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[123] The NIST Cybersecurity Framework provides a robust sequence of 
control activities in response to and recovery from detected security 
incidents.  First, in the Information Protection Processes and Procedures 
category, “[r]esponse plans (Incident Response and Business Continuity) 
and recovery plans (Incident Recovery and Disaster Recovery) are in place 
and managed” and “[r]esponse and recovery plans are tested.”309  Second, 
under the Detect function, the Anomalies and Events category of activities 
help ensure that “[a]nomalous activity is detected in a timely manner and 
the potential impact of events is understood.”310  Third, in the Respond 
function, categories of activities include Response Planning (“[r]esponse 
processes and procedures are executed and maintained, to ensure timely 
response to detected cybersecurity events”), Communications (“[r]esponse 
activities are coordinated with internal and external stakeholders, as 
appropriate, to include external support from law enforcement agencies”), 
Analysis (“[a]nalysis is conducted to ensure adequate response and 
support recovery activities”), Mitigation (“[a]ctivities are performed to 
prevent expansion of an event, mitigate its effects, and eradicate the 
incident”), and Improvements (“[o]rganizational response activities are 
improved by incorporating lessons learned from current and previous 
detection/response activities”).311   Finally, under the Recover function, 
activities include Recovery Planning (“[r]ecovery processes and 
procedures are executed and maintained to ensure timely restoration of 
systems or assets affected by cybersecurity events”); Improvements 
(“[r]ecovery planning and processes are improved by incorporating 
lessons learned into future activities”); and Communications 
(“[r]estoration activities are coordinated with internal and external parties, 
such as coordinating centers, Internet Service Providers, owners of 
attacking systems, victims, other CSIRTs [computer security incident 
response teams], and vendors”).312 
                                                             
309
 Cybersecurity Framework, supra note 134, at 28. 
 
310
 Id. at 30.  
 
311
 See id. at 33–34.  
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F.   Adjust 
 
An Organization Should Periodically Review and Update 
its Policies and Controls for the Security of Protected 
Information 
 
[124] An organization’s operations, activities, and systems change over 
time, as do its information security risks.  An organization should 
therefore periodically evaluate the effectiveness of its information security 
program and make timely changes consistent with the organization’s legal 
requirements, obligations to third-parties, and strategic objectives. 
 
[125] Legal requirements for information security programs uniformly 
require review and updating of such programs on a periodic basis, or 
whenever changed circumstances indicate that such updating is needed.
313
 
                                                                                                                                                       
312
 See id. at 34–35.  
 
313
 See, e.g., 12 C.F.R. pt. 30, app. B(III)(E) (2014).  The Interagency Guidelines 
Establishing Information Security Standards under Gramm-Leach-Bliley state that: 
 
Each bank shall monitor, evaluate, and adjust, as appropriate, the 
information security program in light of any relevant changes in 
technology, the sensitivity of its customer information, internal or 
external threats to information, and the bank's own changing business 
arrangements, such as mergers and acquisitions, alliances and joint 
ventures, outsourcing arrangements, and changes to customer 
information systems. 
 
Id.  The FTC Safeguards Rule under Gramm-Leach-Bliley requires an organization to:  
 
Evaluate and adjust your information security program in light of the 
results of the testing and monitoring required . . . any material changes 
to your operations or business arrangements; or any other 
circumstances that you know or have reason to know may have a 
material impact on your information security program. 
 
16 C.F.R. § 314.4(e) (2014).   
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[126] In its enforcement actions under the Gramm-Leach-Bliley 
Safeguards Rule, the FTC has alleged that companies failed to evaluate 
and adjust their information security programs in light of known or 
identified risks.
314
  The FTC has also found fault with the alleged failure 
of companies to “implement a process for receiving and addressing 
security vulnerability reports from third-party researchers, academics or 
other members of the public, thereby delaying its opportunity to correct 
discovered vulnerabilities or respond to reported incidents.”315 
 
[127] FTC Consent Orders commonly require  
                                                                                                                                                       
The HIPAA Security Rule requires covered entities and business associates to “[p]erform 
a periodic technical and nontechnical evaluation . . . in response to environmental or 
operational changes affecting the security of electronic protected health information, that 
establishes the extent to which a covered entity’s or business associate’s security policies 
and procedures meet the requirements of this subpart.”  45 C.F.R. § 164.308(a)(8) (2013).  
Covered entities and business associates must also review and modify their security 
measures “as needed to continue provision of reasonable and appropriate protection of 
electronic protected health information, and update documentation of such security 
measures . . . .” 45 C.F.R. § 164.306(e) (2013); see also 201 MASS. CODE REGS. 
17.03(2)(h), (i) (2014) (requiring upgrading of information safeguards as necessary to 
limit risks, and “[r]eviewing the scope of the security measures at least annually or 
whenever there is a material change in business practices that may reasonably implicate 
the security or integrity of records containing personal information.”) (Massachusetts PII 
Protection Standards); OR. REV. STAT. ANN. § 646A.622(2)(d)(A)(vi) (West 2011) 
(information security program deemed compliant if, among other matters, the 
organization “[a]djusts the security program in light of business changes or new 
circumstances . . . .”) (Oregon PII Safeguards Statute). 
 
314
 See, e.g., Complaint at 4, In re ACRAnet, Inc., No. C-4331 (F.T.C. Aug. 17, 2011) 
[hereinafter ACRAnet Complaint], 
http://www.ftc.gov/sites/default/files/documents/cases/2011/08/110809acranetcmpt.pdf, 
archived at http://perma.cc/37X2-P749; James B. Nutter & Co. Complaint at 3; Nations 
Title Agency Complaint at 3; SettlementOne Credit & Sackett National Holdings 
Complaint at 4. 
 
315
 HTC America Complaint at 2; see also Fandango Complaint at 4 (“[f]ailing to 
maintain an adequate process for receiving and addressing security vulnerability reports 
from third parties.”). 
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The evaluation and adjustment of the information security 
program in light of the results of the testing and monitoring 
required [by the consent order] . . . , any material changes 
to operations or business arrangements, or any other 
circumstances that Defendant knows or has reason to know 
may have material impact on the effectiveness of the 
information security program.
316
 
 
[128] ISO 27002 provides that “[t]he policies for information security 
should be reviewed at planned intervals or if significant changes occur to 
ensure their continued suitability, adequacy and effectiveness.”317   
 
[129] The NIST Cybersecurity Framework incorporates the concept of 
continuous improvement in its various functions, including Protection 
(“[p]rotection processes are continuously improved”); Detection 
(“[d]etection processes are continuously improved”); Response 
(“[o]rganizational response activities are improved by incorporating 
lessons learned from current and previous detection/response activities.”); 
and Recovery (“[r]ecovery planning and processes are improved by 
incorporating lessons learned into future activities.”).318 
 
III.  CONCLUSION 
 
[130] Litigants and practitioners are vigorously contesting the FTC’s 
authority to enforce information security under Section 5 of the FTC Act, 
in the absence of an underlying regulatory scheme.
319
  This article takes no 
                                                             
316
 See, e.g., Accretive Health Order at 3; see also consent orders cited supra note 43 (for 
similar language in consent orders under Gramm-Leach-Bliley); consent orders cited 
supra note 45 (for language in consent orders under COPPA), and consent orders cited 
supra notes 51, 52, and 54 (for similar language in consent orders under FTC Act § 5).  
 
317
 ISO 27002, supra note 5, at § 5.1.2. 
 
318
 Cybersecurity Framework, supra note 134, at 27, 32, 34–35.  
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position on the validity of such challenges, or on the application of the fair 
notice doctrine to the FTC’s enforcement activities under Section 5.  But, 
there is an irony here. Such challenges seem grounded in the notion that 
sector-specific information security laws provide clear-cut prescriptions 
for information security programs and controls in stark contrast to the 
absence of such specific data security standards under Section 5. 
 
[131] This contrast is largely illusory.  As explored in Section II, the 
concept of reasonableness pervades virtually every expression of United 
States’ information security law, from the most granular standards, such as 
the HIPAA Security Rule, to the FTC’s COPPA regulations, the U.S.-EU 
Safe Harbor’s Security Principle, and numerous state laws, which simply 
require “reasonable” procedures and practices for safeguarding protected 
information without further elaboration.  The fundamental question, 
therefore, is what constitutes a reasonable information security program?   
 
[132] The six elements of a reasonable information security program set 
forth in this article are the common threads that emerge from federal and 
state information security laws.  These elements are also supported by 
other authoritative sources, including ISO 27002 and the NIST 
Cybersecurity Framework.  They allow flexibility regarding the diverse 
security circumstances of different organizations, for they should be 
addressed in a manner consistent with applicable legal requirements and 
the organization’s obligations to third-parties and strategic approach to 
risk management.  But most importantly, these six elements can hopefully 
serve as common ground for organizations in establishing reasonable 
safeguards, in a perilous world for information.  
                                                                                                                                                       
319
 See, e.g., Gerard M. Stegmaier & Wendell Bartnick, Psychics, Russian Roulette, and 
Data Security: The FTC’s Hidden Data-Security Requirements, 20 GEO. MASON L. REV. 
673, 674 (2013); see also Motion to Dismiss by Defendant Wyndham Hotels & Resorts 
LLC at 6–10, FTC v. Wyndham Worldwide Corp., No. 12-cv-01365-PHX-PGR (D. Ariz. 
Aug. 27, 2012).  
